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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
In the short space of sixteen years investment
trusts have become a major industry, investing and hand-
ling over a billion investment dollars. In view of this
very rapid growth, it seems plausible that some attention
should be given to the subject of investment trusts. It
will not be the purpose of this thesis to cover all phases
of investment trusts, but rather to limit the study to one
type; namely, management trusts, and to further limit the
study to those aspects of management trusts that are of
importance to the investor. In other words, this study,
when completed, will attempt to show the potential inves-
tor the advantages of investment trust securities, but
pointing out along the way the weaknesses to be found in
the trusts, and the items the investor should note in an
intelligent analysis of the trusts.
The question of management will be considered
from the standpoint of efficiency in the handling of in-
vestors' funds; compensation, which is a very important
phase of management trusts, and the methods of appraising
various types of management within this field of finance.
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2Definitions of Terms Used :
Investment Company. Throughout this thesis an
Investment company will be a trust or issuer which
(1) holds Itself out as being engaged primarily
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trad-
ing in securities; and
(2) is engaged in the business of investing, re-
investing, owning, holding, or trading in securities
having a value exceeding forty per cent of the value
of each issuer’s total assets.^
Since the purpose of this study is not to con-
duct a research into all classes of investment trusts,
of which there are four main types - including (1) open-
end company, a management company which is offering for
sale, or has outstanding, any redeemable security of
which it is the issuer; (2) closed-end company, which is
any management company other than an open-end company -
but rather to limit the study to management companies,
2
a clear definition is necessary.
The Federal Government, which has recently passed
the Investment Company Act of 1940, clearly defines the
management concept of investment trusts.
1. Investment Companies - Public
,
No. 768, 76th
Congress, H.R.
,
10065, p. 10
2. Ibid., p. 12
•.
.
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5Management investment companies; in which
management has complete discretion as to
the investments to be made. These com-
panies are subdivided into open-end com-
panies -- those in which the security
holders can, at their option, compel the
company to redeem or repurchase their se-
curities at the actual asset value of such
securities; and closed-end companies --
those which do not accord this privilege
to the stockholders
To better understand the American investment
trust a short history of the beginning of this type of
financial institution will be helpful.
The origin of the investment trust can be traced
to the formation of the Societe de Belgique in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century. This institution was
founded by the royal family of Holland before the separa-
tion of Belgium and Holland. After the separation of
these two countries the stock of the company fell into
private hands and during the course of time the company
acquired a wide latitude of holdings in private corpora-
tions. Since this institution purchased these securities,
not only for investment but also for control, it was not
a pure investing trust. The investment trust made con 7
siderable progress in Switzerland, but had little success
in France, Germany, or the rest of the continent. "Its
greatest development occurred in England, where in that
3. Ibid., p. 6

4quarter of the last century a number of these Institu-
tions were formed,"^
The early British investment trusts fol-
lowed highly speculative policies and suf-
fered heavy losses in the panic of 1890,
which seriously depressed securities on
the various exchanges of the world. 5
However, these trusts, profiting by these unfor-
tunate experiences, and as a result, until World War I,
followed very conservative policies by investing in
high-grade securities and accumulating vast surpluses
for future losses. The capitalization of English trusts
generally consists of preferred stock which comes with
its prior claim on dividends, usually fixed at a certain
percentage. The second class of stock is ordinary, or
common stock which generally receives additional earn-
ings on the trust after preferred dividends have been
paid. The former issue, as in any company, has a lim-
ited yield but is a safer investment as the dividends
are guaranteed. The common stock offers the possibility
of a higher yield with increased risks. In 1935 the total
capital of the British investment trusts was estimated at
g
a billion dollars.
4. Moulton, H. G., Financial Organization and the
Economic System ("New York, 1938), p. 17t>
5. Ibid
., p .~T78
6. ibid.
, p . 176
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5Prom the British trusts America, in the post-war
years, copied the trust idea, American development had
started before this but the era of real growth followed
the war
,
The evolution of the investment trust in the
United States has passed through three stages; namely,
the period of growth, when the emphasis was on foreign
issues. At this time there were only seventeen registered
companies, and the total estimated assets amounted to less
than fifteen million dollars. The second stage, from 1925
to 1929, was a period of very rapid expansion during which
the estimated market value of the assets rose to a maximum
7
of about six billion dollars. At this point operations
were more or less confined to American securities. The
third stage, covering the years from 1930 to 1935, was
known as the consolidation period. As a result of shrink-
age in the security values, the assets dropped to 1,5 bil-
lion dollars in 1932, subsequently rising to approximately
o
2,4 billion dollars as of December 31, 1935. At the close
Q
of 1936 the companies in this field totaled 1077.
The enormous expansion in the investment trust
field in the years 1925 to 1929 was simply a part of a
general development in the field of finance resulting from
7 . Lo c . cit
.
8. Md., p. 177
9. Ibid., p. 181
.1
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a surplus of money and the spirit of the times. Other
factors included the extension of foreign loans and mass
speculation in the securities market.
At this period many financial institutions at-
tempted to start investment trusts and consequently mis-
management was widespread. In the ensuing depression
losses to investors in many investment trusts were stag-
gering. In a vast number of cases the stockholders’
entire equity was wiped out. By 1952 the shares of some
well-managed trusts were selling for one-half the face
value, while their holdings could be sold in the market
for proportionately more. However, the reorganization of
the following years along lines suggested by successful
trusts have again placed this institution in a position
to render a very useful service to the investing public.
The self-organization of many trusts has recent-
ly been followed by the passage of the Federal Government'
Investment Company Act of 1940. This bill has done much
to clarify the situation. The makers of the act felt that
the industry had, on the whole, voluntarily done away with
malpractices and mismanagement. However, it was apparent
that complete divorce of these evils from the industry
could not be realized without the enactment of a Federal
law. This conclusion was conceded by virtually every wit-
ness who appeared before the sub-committee, and was the
.V V
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7opinion of a great number of persons within the industry.
The Securities Act of 1923 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 have not acted as deterrents to the
continuous occurrence of abuses in the organization and
management of investment companies.
In view of the history concerning the rise of in-
vestment trusts many will ask, "Why investment trusts?"
The answer may be given in one word - security. This
security, which is of the utmost importance to the small
investor, may be found in those companies which give to
the investor, for a relatively small amount of money, the
diversification of securities which means a secure invest-
ment of his money in the light of vast industrial holdings.
Since the World War small investors have had opened
to them new and heretofore unattainable fields for invest-
ment of minimum amounts of money. It started a new age of
finance, giving to "one-share" investors the right to place
their money in companies which in the past were financed by
the powerful few.
Robinson says: "The person of modest means came
into his own during the nationwide Liberty Loan drives,
and the salutory habit of clipping coupons has continued
with our people." 10
10. Robinson, L. R., Investment Trusts, Organization and
Management (New York: Ronald Press, 1929 ) , p . 12
.
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8In the pre-war and pre-depression days the average
investor felt secure if his excess funds were placed in
"Governments" or so-called "gilt-edge" securities. More
than one investment expert advised his listeners to place
their funds in railway stocks and bonds. Today many see
the folly of this policy. The average railroad stocks and
bonds are far below the par value or even the price at
which they were purchased in the past. Stocks and bonds
of rails are large speculative issues.
Where does the "one-share" investor stand on this
scheme of things? He can ill afford counsel for invest-
ments where the fee would wipe out any profit. Consequently,
many small investors are turning to sound investment trusts
for the safety that comes from diversification, investment
counsel and good management. The investor receives all
this by holding investment trust issues.
All this material answers the question - "Why
investment trusts?"
The body of this thesis will then assume that the
question has been answered, and with the answering of the
interrogation comes the next inquiry - "How may an investor
determine the type of trust best fitted to his needs - what
shall the investor look for?"
The author of this thesis feels that management
investment trusts offer to the investor the safest type
of investment trust.

If the research is successful, at its completion
the potential investor will have before him a study that
will serve as a guide to investing in these trusts. The
most important phases of this industry will he covered.
In the appendix the author will present for study
typical companies in this industry. They will he pre-
sented from the following standpoints: date of incorpora-
tion, classification of portfolios, types of securities
issued, officials of the company, securities that the
trust must purchase, according to the agreements signed
hy the trust.
In any study of these trusts attention should he
called to a kindred agency which has developed in recent
years, the investment counsel. As the name implies, its
primary purpose is to advise either individuals, groups
of individuals, or companies on investment procedure.
The service is intended to he of a two-
fold character: to select a sound and well-
halanced list of securities adapted to the
needs and circumstances of each client; and,
second, to shift their security holdings,
from time to time, from bonds to stocks,
and vice versa, with a view to taking ad-
vantage of major market trends. Their
greatest service has been in restricting
the portfolios of their clients to repre-
sentative and marketable securities . 1
11. Moulton, h. ti.. Financial Organization and the
Economic System (New York, 1936), pp. 18l, 182
«ij Jb '.i -s-i ewW 'sc3> -vi i io’i i
.
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As has already been cited, the average investor
has neither the securities nor the money to seek advice
from investment counsellors. But the investment trust
has both the holdings and finances to use for this type
of aid. Today, most every trust has either at its dis-
posal or in the organization itself staffs of market
technicians whose sole duty is to advise action to be
taken on the movements of the major exchanges.

CHAPTER II
MANAGEMENT
The fundamental reason for the existence of man-
agement investment companies, or investment trust funds,
is stated in Glascow’s hook as follows: “The basic prin-
ciple of the trust company method; that is, of the good
trust company, expressed in another way, is the prior
assumption that there is no such thing as security in
finance."
1
This is rather a startling statement, but
true. The management investment trust, by virtue of
authorization of power to the management and the use of
diversification, attempts to solve and remove this inse-
curity.
The lack of security and the ever-changing nature
of the financial and economic worlds has been proved many
2times. The study by Standard Statistics of six portfol-
ios of common stocks set up respectively on December 31,
1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, and carried forward
to the end of 1929, Indicated some rather startling
changes. One share of the common stock of each of the
twenty companies was included every time. Altogether
fifty- three stocks were included in the several portfolios,
1. Glascow, The English Investment Trust Companies
(London; Eyre Spolleswade
,
Ltd., l93b), p. V
2. Standard Statistics, August 1930
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and twenty-one of the fifty-three had to he eliminated
due to the passing of dividends or to other causes. Each
elimination resulted in a depreciation of the original
capital investment.
The fact that securities are continually chang-
ing in investment merit has been cited many times. In an
article entitled "Blue Chips, Unless Recounted Often Tend
to Turn Pink,” a statement was made that at the end of
1919 a group of sixteen stocks, with uninterrupted divi-
dend records up to thirty-six years, could be purchased
at the end of 1929. The value of the sixteen investments
at this date (1929) had decreased from 1.6 per cent to
89.6 per cent of the original investment with an average
of twenty-five per cent. The uninterrupted dividend re-
ceived at the end of 1919 averaged fifteen years. What
all this illustrates is the necessity for intelligent
supervision of investments through the years rather than
the patience on the part of the investor to determine
high-grade stocks through a history of dividend record
of any particular security or group of securities.
Illustrations such as this could be cited indef-
initely. Investors know from experience that with the
possible exception (in normal times) of high-grade gov-
ernments, municipals, railroads, industrial and utility
5. New York Saturday Evening Post
,
July 26, 1950
...
.
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bonds, changes are necessary from time to time in any
investment list. This is probably the most important
service of the management investment company, as the man-
agers are given the opportunity to supervise and change
the portfolio to meet changing conditions.
Management investment companies of many types have
operated in the United States for several decades, although
prior to 1923 only a few such companies existed and they
were generally limited in clientele. With the long ’'bull"
market in stocks, and the prosperity from 1924 to 1929 the
number of these trusts multiplied rapidly.
Investment trusts, partially, but holding compan-
ies, finance companies and trading companies, to a greater
extent, were the last development in the 1928-29 stock-
market frenzy. As a result the common stock of these com-
panies soared to unwarranted heights and in 1929 were sell-
ing, on the average, at about fifty per cent in excess of
the actual underlying liquidating values per share. This
excess of liquidating value was premium.
With reference to management trusts alone, the
stocks; that is, majority of them, declined from this men-
tioned premium to substantial discounts below liquidating
values, and remained at discounts throughout 1930 and 1931.
4
Keans’ s Manual makes known the fact that at the
4. Keane, Investment Trust Monthly (March, 1931), p. 125
..
.
.
.
.
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end of 1929 a group of seventy-nine management investment
stocks were selling, on the average, at 90.4 per cent of
their liquidating values. At the end of 1950 this same
group of stocks of the seventy-nine investment companies
were selling at 83.3 per cent of their net asset value.
5
On June 30, 1931 the stocks of forty-six investment
trusts were selling on the average at 72.1 per cent of
their net asset value. The lower percentage of June, 1931,
was due partly to the inclusion of eleven preferred stocks,
several of which were selling at a very low ratio to their
net asset values.
As to the operating results of management invest-
ment trusts for 1929, 1930, 1931, figures could he gath-
ered indicating that the aggregate declines of total as-
sets of such organizations were considerably less than the
declines of the stock market during these years. This is
only natural for a portion of the assets were in cash,
bonds and preferred stocks and management, as a whole,
anticipated the decline during this period and built up
liquid assets as a result. Whereas the average perform-
ance was better than the decline of the market for the
same period, the performance of some managers was not as
satisfactory; while the performance of other managers was
better and, in some cases, considerably better than this
5*1 Ibid. (August, 1931 ) , p . 389
.
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average. Individual analyses of investment trusts become
a factor of importance and should be the conclusion drawn
gfrom the foregoing material.
In reviewing the rise of investment trusts one
factor, as has been pointed out, is all-important; namely,
management. With this in mind a discussion of management
will be presented on the following pages.
The fundamentals of investment trusts are con-
stant. Regardless of the type of trust the same prin-
ciples must be pursued if the trust is to have a success-
7ful management and financial history. The fundamentals
of sound management are: protection of debentures and pre-
ferreds, not only from an asset but also from an income
standpoint; the maintenance of a portion of the fund in
cash at all times, the use of bank loans as only temporary
methods of financing, and on relatively small amounts, an
adequate distribution of risks at all times, a continual
attempt to anticipate unfavorable economic and financial
developments and the continual building up and adding to
reserves and earned surplus
.
To maintain these principles of safety American
management trusts have copied the practices of foreign
investment trusts. Williams and Marshall state:
6. Standard Statistics
,
March 50, 1931, p. 15
7. Durst, W.N., Analysis and Handbook of Investment
Trusts (New York: Rand, McNally and Company, 1932)
,
p. 39

16
American trusts are, to a certain extent,
showing tendencies to follow a practice
which is almost universal abroad — the
management of the trust and its financing
are performed by another amalgamation which
might be called the management company or
fiscal agent.
°
A further idea in the investment trust field in
America is stated by the same authors:
Management of the trust and its financing
are performed by another organization which
might be called the management. Also a group
of trusts grouped together under control of
one management. This has a tendency to re-
duce the financing costs of each trust in the
group as well as the management cost.
Management investment trusts should be consid-
ered in the light of the following comment by Professor
A. S. Dewing:
There must be foresight, guidance or control
in every business enterprise; someone must
buy raw materials and pay labor its daily or
weekly wage, whether the goods manufactured
sell for more or less than the expenditures
involved in their costs. The business man-
ager is no less significant than the laborer
and his wages, the capitalist and his inter-
est, and the business must yield a sufficient
profit to reward this manager for his plan-
ning and the risks he is taking in paying his
various contractual obligations . -*-0
8. Williams and Marshall , Investment Trusts in America
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928), p. 22
9. Ibid., p. 23
10.
Dewing, A. S., Financial Policies of Corporations
(New York: Ronald Press)
,
pp . 1182-1186
' 01 f
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This last quoted paragraph suggests the question
of the amount of management participation in the financing
of a management investment trust. The usual assumption is
that the managers and their associates will furnish a por-
tion of the original capital. Managers, for their partici-
pation in financing, usually obtain securities junior to
those held by the public. And, consequently, several
years of successful operation are necessary to increase
the value of the junior holdings, while the public hold-
ings receive a dividend from the time of formation, or
shortly thereafter, and have senior claims on assets and
earnings
.
For management * s successful operation of the trust
some compensation must be made. To compensate management
five general plans are now in use. These plans tie to-
gether the interested public and the management.
The five methods of compensation are: 11 (1) by
class A and B stock; (2) by a bonus of common stock to
organizers and their associates and the public; (3) by
options for the future purchase of the trust common stock
at a price above, below, or at the issue price given to
the organizers; (4) by an earning or contract basis; (5)
by an arrangement under which the organizers and the
11. Durst, W.N.,op clt ., pp. 60-67
.. ..
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public are to remain on practically an equal basis through
the increased value of common stock purchased under the
same general plan.
To the potential investment trust investor these
plans should prove of importance for upon these plans are
determined the earnings of the public and the management
as well as the control each group has in the company.
Class A and Class B stocks are the securities in
the plan whereby Class A is superior to B, both as to div-
idends and asset payments. Class A is sold to the public
and B is retained by the organizers and managers. This
plan requires that satisfactory results are to be shown
over a period of time before dividend payments on B stock
is possible, and an increased asset value on the same
class. Class A and B arrangement is a partnership, the
public supplying the senior capital and the organizers
and management supplying the junior capital. In some
cases Class B stock has the sole, or majority, voting
power; hence, making it, in many cases, as valuable or
more valuable than Class A stocks.
Important considerations from the standpoint of
the investor are: the relationship of the amount paid by
the public for the Class A stock as to the amount paid
for the Class B; the ratio and the extent of priority as
to earnings and dividends of the Class A in comparison
with Class B.
’.
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The second plan is one in which the original stock,
both to the organizers and to the public, is virtually a
bonus. This plan requires that several years of satis-
factory and better than average results are necessary to
create and build up equity for the common stock.
In most cases the management and organizers fur-
nish a major portion of the capital and have the advantage
of the use of the entire capital with which they are able
to show their ability to successfully handle and invest
this money. On the other hand, the public have purchased
preferred stocks or so-called senior securities, receiv.e
interest and dividends from their holdings and, as a re-
sult of successful operation, the common stock may in-
crease in value.
In the meantime, the preferreds, which are usually
sold at par, may decline. This is due to many causes, the
more important being changes in the money market, causing
lower prices for fixed interest and dividend obligations.
The investor should closely check the investment policies
of trusts using common stocks as bonuses. Unless the pol-
icy is conservative and can show unusual appreciation in
the security market considerable time will elapse before
a substantial equity is built up for the common stock
bonus
.

20
The third plan of cooperation between the public
and management is the granting to management the right
or option for the future purchase of stock at stated
prices. In some cases the public is granted warrants
similar to those allowed the managers. If such rights
are conferred above the issue price, several years of
constructive investment management will be necessary to
make the exercise of these rights profitable. If the
options or warrants are extended below issue price, the
later exercise of these rights may tend to reduce the
equity of each share outstanding.
Compensation to managers for their services
may be provided by allocating to managers a
portion of investment trust earnings through
the ownership of shares or option on the
trust issues. ^
If this right is exercised above the issue price,
the plan is similar to the Class B arrangement and the
stock will have to become more valuable to make the war-
rants useful. But if the warrants are exercised below
the issue price they will tend to pull down the value of
the stock.
Under the terms of the fourth plan, which is an
earnings or contract basis, the management and/or the
organizers derive a certain percentage of the profits
12. Fowler, J. F., American Investment Trusts (New York:
Harper Bros., 1928), pp. 14*7, 148
.-
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of the corporation since the beginning of the operation.
Under this plan the management receives no compensation
unless the corporation earns annually a certain percent-
age on the capital and surplus as of the beginning of the
year. Such earning requirements are cummulative so that
in any one year the company fails to earn a profit of the
specified amount, the difference may be made up in subse-
quent earning periods; that is, before the management is
allowed any compensation.
Another plan under this general heading is one in
which a small percentage of the average resources, usually
at market value, is paid to the managers. These percent-
ages are usually l/8 of 1 per cent quarterly, or j? of 1
per cent annually, and cover all statistical, research
13
and investment managerial services.
Managers’ compensation may be derived from
charges for raising capital and from a re-
demption fee, if any. It may take the form
of a management fee which is paid out of the
income. The standard management fee is of
1 per cent of invested capital. 14
Management fees of four typical open-end trusts
15
are cited below;
13. Durst, W.N.
, 0£. clt . , p. 66
14. Fowler, J.F., op. cit., p. 147
15. Ibid., p. 148
..
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% of % on
Invested Income
Capital
Incorporated Investors
•^Investing Corporation
of America 15
Investors Management Company -|-
Massachusetts Investors
Trust 6
•*Fee is after deduction of 5% annually on amounts paid in.
This fourth plan has an advantage from the view-
point of the investor, since the managers are usually paid
on the basis of average market value of assets and will
naturally endeavor to report market values of assets as
high as possible in order to receive larger income for
managerial services.
The fifth plan is that of the sale of common stock
of the investment trust to the public at the same price as
to the organizers, and without any other methods of com-
pensation attached thereto.
This is sometimes accomplished through the sale of
units of preferred and common stock. The organizers fur-
nish a smaller share of the original capital than the pub-
lic, but are to receive a generous portion of future earn-
ings through substantial stock holdings.
Fowler states: "Compensation to managers for
their services may be provided by allocating to managers
...
.....
22
a portion , . . earnings through their ownership of ...
option or shares.’'^
Variations are possible on all these plans. One
such variation is worked out from the fifth plan; namely,
that of selling the stock to the public and organizers at
the same price. The organizers may retain voting power
through the creation of voting stock as compared with
public non-voting stock. Other plans have placed the
organizers and the holding public on equal footing as
to future participation in earnings.
There are many minor details that should be of
Importance to the investor; organization expenses may be
borne outright by the organizers and the operating ex-
penses carried by the managers; the directors and of-
ficers may serve a certain length of time without sal-
aries. Outweighing these generous considerations is the
fact that the organizers have the use of the capital, in
many instances without restriction, but definite manager-
ial results are more important.
To further consider the principles of management
investment trusts; once the potential investor has de-
termined his relationship In regard to his holdings, it
is of importance to consider the actual managers from
16. Ibid., p. 147
! * •
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the point of view of honesty, experience, knowledge of
finance and securities.
Enough has been written to indicate the impor-
tance of management in trusts as in any other business
enterprise. Therefore, we may conclude that management
is the most important aspect of this industry that the
potential investor must study before his funds are placed
in one trust or another. Ability may often be determined
by past experience, and training may be readily ascer-
tained. Perhaps the most important angle from which to
view management is stated by Williams: "Would I choose
17these men for the trustees of my affairs?" It is then
important to ascertain if these men are in any way con-
nected with other interests in such capacities as to prej-
udice them in a free selection of securities for the trust.
If such is the case the investor would do better to pass
by this trust. For an outside interest would, in many
cases, do away with the proper diversification necessary
to the proper functioning of a successful trust. This
would only happen in trusts where the managers were not
answerable for the securities held. The danger becomes
obvious when one considers that cupidity might cause the
officers to change the trust's holdings for an outside
17. Williams and Marshall, op. cit. ,p. 7b
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consideration. In such an event the assets of the trust
might decline to such an extent that the investors’
equity might he totally lost.
... dishonesty can ruin an Investment trust
as well as any other institution, which
brings about a reiteration of the necessity
of carefully examining the records of the
officers and directors.
Managerial ability can express Itself just
as logically as in the operation of an in-
dustrial enterprise, and the investment
trust is in business to build up reserves
and dividends for stockholders through
alert seizures of investment possibilities. 8
An investor will do well to note the names of
men in any way connected with the trust. These state-
ments, along with other aspects of the company, are on
file with many government and private agencies, among
them being the New York Stock Exchange, Poor's, Moody's,
or any other book publishing listings of companies.
Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the
type and character of the men who control the policies
of an investment trust as well as any other type of
business
.
This chapter has dealt with:
(1) the reason for the existence of manage-
ment Investment trusts;
18. Ibid., p. 77
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(2) the changing character of securities
that call for a clear understanding of markets
and securities hacked by the ability to so handle
these securities as to make a profit for the
holders
;
(5) the fact that, though the net assets of
management investment trusts declined during
1929, 50, 31, the decline was not as great as
the decline of the stock market during these
same years.
(4) the methods of management compensation,
and the
(5) further principles of management in
regard to ability, experience, and honesty.
As has been previously cited, management is the
most important phase of business, be it the investment
trusts, industrial enterprises, or any other business
activity. In view of this statement emphasis has been
placed upon principles of management in the management
19investment trust field.
The following chapter will be a study of load
charges, expenses and incidental costs of the invest-
ment trust field.
19. ibid., p. 77
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CHAPTER III
EARNINGS AND EXPENSES OF THE TRUST
Earnings and expenses of the trust and of the
investor, although of importance, are comparatively
minor factors in analyzing investment trusts. However,
the more important factors and considerations regard-
ing management trusts are the earnings and other
achievements obtained by the management.'*'
The annual operating expenses of the English
and Scottish investment trusts amount to
about 4/10 to 5/10 of 1 per cent of the
total capital. Such low expense ratios are
usually possible only after several years’
operations. In a survey, of management in-
vestment trusts for 1929^ operating expenses
of sixty generally diversified investment
trusts amounted to 6/10 of 1 per cent of the
total invested capital; twenty-six finance,
trading, and holding companies reported op-
erating expenses of 4.10 of 1 per cent. The
general average of 105 companies was 5/10 of
1 per cent.
"In a survey of the ratio of expenses to assets
for 1930, ^ the average expense ratio of forty-four man-
agement investment trusts and related companies was 0.87
per cent. The ratios varied from 0.16 per cent to 2.29
1. Durst, W. N., (9) , op. clt . , p. 81
2. Ibid . , (14), p. 82
3 . Standard Statistics, Trade and Securities Service ,
Mar. 30, 1531
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per cent.” The average expense ratio for 1951 may have
4been slightly higher as expenses possibly were not re-
duced as rapidly as the depreciation of total net assets,
although some companies reported reduction of assets.
To further study the expenses of management
trusts the investor should carefully investigate the
load charges or loading charges, of the management
trusts. This charge is simply a "top” or burden of
organization placed upon the investor upon the pur-
chase of the securities to pay for the cost of distri-
bution; i.e., to cover the distribution companies' cost
and the profit of the salesmen.
"Loading charge may be characterized as the
known premium which the investor must pay to partici-
pate in the investment company.” Loading charges may
be justified upon the same grounds as of the wholesal-
ers' profit in commodity distribution. Without the mid-
dleman, who must make a profit to remain in business,
prices would rise to the consumer as producers were
forced to assume the entire burden of distribution.
Furtner justification arises when one considers
that during the earlier periods of an investment trust's
4. Ibid., Mar. 11, 1932
5. U. 3. Government, Investment Trust and Investment
Securities and Excnange Commission, 1939
-. .
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life the securities are very often difficult to sell in
competition with well-known shares.
To repeat the analogy of the wholesale distrib-
utor; on a product being introduced to a market, the
ip
wholesaler very often demands a higher commission in
view of the cost involved in carrying (in his stock)
a product which, as yet, lacks a secure following.
The question of loading charges is important
only when the investor wants to determine the amount
of his money that will go to work for him in the in-
vestment trust. It is not usually possible for him
to learn just what is the cost to the trust in the sale
of its capital or obligations.
The Federal Government, in a report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission made during 1959,
rather critically reviews the management trusts, both
the open-end and the closed-end types.
In reviewing the open-end concept in relation
to the cost to the investor and the distributor, the
report states:
The shares of forty open-end investment
companies outstanding as of December 31,
193b, represents an original investment
of about $422,000,000. Since a total of
67 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies
. c T V '• •
' 1 .
1
$564,000,000 was paid into these com-
panies during the period, it might he
supposed that the $142,000,000 or 25%
of the total paid in by investors, re-
turned to shareholders through repur-
chases represented by the extent of the
turnover of investors in this type of
investment company. However, the fac-
tors must be considered which tend to
alter this turnover ratio considerably.
The principal distribution of each of
the larger open-end investment compan-
ies . .
.
purchased shares from dealers
and the public and resold these shares
immediately, without the investment
companies’ being involved in the tran-
sactions. Data upon the volume of such
trading are available for several of the
larger companies and it is estimated
therefrom that about $50,000,000 of
open-end company shares were so pur-
chased and resold. In addition, there
is the whole field of trading in shares
of open-end companies by dealers and
others. Although no definite data are
available, it is known that there are
active over-the-counter markets for
these shares and that was considerable
activity by dealers in switching cus-
tomers from one open-end company to
another .
®
Based upon the foregoing estimates it appears
that for each dollar invested in open-end investment
companies as of the end of 1938, it was necessary to
market almost three dollars’ worth of shares.
Closed-end companies differ from the open-end
type in thet closed-end trusts usually make single or
7. Glascow, The English Investment Trust Companie s
(London : Eyre Spolleswade, Ltd., 1930 ) , p . TO”
8. Ibid., p. 13
< *
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isolated offerings of their shares and changes in owner-
ship thereafter require only the payment of brokerage
commissions. A similar turnover in the shares of open-
end investment companies, however, involves a repurchase
and resale, either through the investment companies or
intermediate markets of the dealers or distribution,
and the cost to the new shareholder includes the addi-
gtion of another selling commission or load charge.
The justification that exists for the relatively
high selling commissions of open-end securities during
the earlier stages of development, due to the difficulty
of marketing unknown shares, is followed, to some degree,
by the three largest open-end investment companies'^
(Massachusetts Investors Trust, Incorporated Investors,
and State Street Investment Corporation) . These three
companies have had loading charges during periods of
active distribution generally lower than other open-end
investment companies maintaining active selling organ-
izations .
Merrill Griswold, chairman and trustee of
Massachusetts Investors Trust, testified in regard to
9^ In addition, there was sometimes charged a redemption
fee which increased the cost to the public of main-
taining individual funds.
10. Williams and Marshall, Investment Trusts in America
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1928)
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this company's increased loading charge in 1930 from
5% to 1% of the offering price; on February 1, 1932,
it again increased the load to 8^ of the offering
price, and on May 20, 1933, it maintained the load of
Q% of the offering price.
11
Q. What was the reason for the increase
in the load to 1930 and 1932?
A. The reason was that in those days the
stock naturally did not sell as high
as it does now, and the dealer had to
sell more shares to make the commission
that he does now ... We had to meet
competition. Most of the trusts in the
country charged about Q% or more ...
If we at that time had reduced our load
to I don't think anybody would have
sold our shares. They could get a bet-
ter load from some one else.
The total load, or selling cost, of
selling these shares to the public
which was deductible from that figure
(operating costs) was $5,900,000. Is
that correct?
A. Yes.
4 . And the total operating expenses, in-
cluding taxes over the same period
were $1,500,000? That is approximately
correct?
A. I assume that is correct.
Q. So that it cost about four and one-half
times to get into this as you felt it
necessary to manage it?
ITT Op. Cit
. ,
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A. It costs anywhere from 8 to 6 per cent
to get into this trust, and our oper-
ating expenses averaged between 10 and
14 per cent per annum. They are now
running at the rate of 10 per cent.
The material in the foregoing pages will serve
to show the investor just what the cost is to him upon
placing his money in an open-end investment trust.
This thesis has touched upon loading charges as an item
for the investor to study. Now a study of these charge
seems apropos, having disclosed in the preceding pages
the cost to the investor of distribution of open-end
shares.
The main source of compensation received by
the distributors and dealers from the sale
of shares of open-end investment companies
is the published sales commission or load-
ing charge. This charge is usually ex-
pressed as a fixed percentage of the net
asset value per share and represents the
disclosed premium over the basic price which
the investor pays to become a stockholder or
participant in the open-end company. 1 ^
This load is designed to cover all the distri-
bution costs of the principal distributor and dealer.
Similarly redemption fees charges upon redemption of
shares are used by some open-end companies to cover the
costs of repurchasing shares.
12. Durst, V/." ¥.
,
op. clt
.
,
p . 40
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Although the portions of the published "load-
ing charges" retained by the dealers and distributors
do not seem higher than commissions received by dis-
tributors of other types of securities, the open-end
distributor system permits the inclusion of certain
multiple and hidden profits which do not prevail in
the closed-end companies.
"The starting point in the determination of the
distribution of profits from open-end investment com-
pany shares is the per share liquidating or net asset
n
„13
value .
"
The theory behind this is that each new share
will be sold by the company for an amount equal to the
liquidating value of each outstanding share, and that
each share at redemption will entitle the holder to a
pro-rata part of the total assets.
All open-end companies are similar in that any
calculation of offering and redemption prices starts
with the net asset value per share, which in turn is
based upon the market value of an estimated value of
the portfolio holdings of the company. The method of
computing the asset value is usually set forth in the
charter or trust indenture.
15. Ibid., p. 18
. : /
• &
.
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The Federal Government, during the course of
14
its investigation, compiled a table of "Methods of
Calculating Liquidating Value for Purpose of Sale by
38 Open-end Management Companies."
I Valuation of Portfolio Securities
Prices of securities traded on an
exchange are based on :
Number of
Companies
Last sale price
Closing bid price
Prices of securities not traded
on exchange are based on :
Closing bid price
Average of closing bid price
and asked price
Valuation made on prices as of :
Day of' sale of trust securities
Previous day
Other
Prices are adjusted:
To nearest dollar
Yes (not specified)
No
36
2 38
28
10 38
7
23
8 38
3
1
34 38
II To Value of Funds as computed
are added:
Yes No
Full lot brokerage
Odd lot brokerage
Odd lot premiums
administrative fees
Fees of custodians or trustees
Other items
3 34
0 38
1 37
0 38
0 38
7 31
14. Fowler (figures as of Dec. 1935)
‘l.
' L* 5
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III From Total Assets are deducted Yes No
book liabilities and :
Estimated taxes on unrealized
appreciation 24 14
Other charges 5 33
IV The resulting per share figure
is adjusted tol
Nearest cent 24
Next highest cent 8
Nearest five cents 1
Nearest eighth 1
Nearest quarter 1
Not adjusted 3
The asset value mentioned is the amount received
by the investment company from sales of its own shares
paid out by the company upon redemption in liquidation
of its shares. The fees and loading charges superim-
posed upon the asset value usually go to the chief dis-
tributor.
"An interesting factor in the determination of
the basic price of the shares is the return of capital
15
received by new stockholders as dividends."
It has been the practice of many open-end com-
panies to calculate the selling price of each new share
so that it will include a sum equal to the per share
15. U. S. Government Report, op. clt . , p. 21
-.
.
amount set aside by the company for the payment of the
next dividend or the shares already outstanding. This
amount received by the company is distributed on the
next dividend date. This method simply protects the
old stockholder. It is not always brought to the at-
tention of the new stockholder that he is receiving a
return of capital in the form of dividends.
The next item of expense that should be noted
by the investor is the published load. This charge
has been stated in a number of ways: as a percentage
of the asset value, as a percentage of the offering
price of the share, or as a specified dollar amount.
To cite simple illustrations of this published
load which may be more understandable than a statement
of procedure:
Percentage of asset value -- Assuming each
share of stock has a net asset value of $100, and the
percentage is 5$, the investor would be bound to pay
the published load of $6 for each $100 worth of stock
purchased.
Percentage of offering price -- If the stock 1
offered at $100 while the asset value Is $90, the per-
centage here would be $6 on the $100 offer end not on
the asset value of the Issue.
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Specified dollar amount -- Regardless of the
asset value of the stock or its offering price, the pub-
lished load would be a certain dollar figure over the
price of the security.
'‘Since 1933 there has been a slight movement to-
ward lower loading charges." Table 3, which lists sell-
ing commissions charged upon shares of thirty -nine open-
end investment companies during the 1927-1935 period, in-
16
dicates these trends. The next fee or expense that the
investor should study in open-end investment companies is
the redemption fee.
In some open-end investment companies redemp-
tion commissions or fees were deducted in
addition to the adjustments previously re-
lated in the computation of liquidating
values for the purpose of redemption.-1-'
At the end of 1935, seventeen of the thirty-
nine open-end companies charged a fee for
redemption. Six of the eight investment
companies which permitted the principal
distribution to receive the redemption fee
were in the group sponsored by managers of
investment funds and the shares of all were
sold with loading charges below the average
for open-end investment companies.-1-®
Of the fifteen large open-end Investment compan-
ies there were only three which had redemption charges
16. Government Report, op. cit., p. 22
17. Ibid., p. 24
18. Loc. Cit.
.'
‘I a •
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in effect as of December 31, 1935. State Street
Investment Corporation permitted deduction by the prin-
cipal distributors of a fee of $1 for each share repur-
chased. The company explained this charge as a form of
insurance on the part of the management corporation
which had long-term commitment on salaries, etc.
"The Spencer Trash Fund, Incorporated, redeemed
its shares at" ... 99% of its net asset value, retaining
the 1% liquidating fee, so that the benefit accrued to
the remaining stockholders rather then to any distrib-
utor.
Massachusetts Trust has had the right to make
such a charge but has not done so. The original pro-
visions of the trust agreement required this investment
trust to redeem its shares at net asset value less $2
per share and after February 1, 1929, it was required
at net asset value less 1%,
With respect to the use of redemption fees,
H. Dudley Swim, vice-president of National Investors
Corporation, stated:
It seems only proper that the trust it-
self should receive any redemption fee.
Furthermore, I incline to the opinion
that a nominal redemption fee, say of
be retained by the trust, is proper
19. Government Report, ojo. clt .
,
p. 25

and desirable in order to offset the
expenses of the withdrawing stock-
holders’ "round trip," which otherwise
would be borne by the fund and then
hence, the remaining investors. 20
Methods of Calculating Liquidating Value
for Purposes of Redemption by Thirty-eight Open-
end Management Companies 21
I Valuation of Portfolio Securities Number of
Prices of securities traded on ah Companies
Exchange are based, on
Last sale price
Closing bid price
Prices of securities not traded on
an exchange are based on
Closing bid price
Average of closing bid and
asked price
Valuation made on prices as of:
Day of tender for repurchase
Next day following
Other
Prices are adjusted
To nearest dollar
Yes (not specified)
No
55
5 38
28
10 38
13
13
12 38
3
1
34 38
20. Derived from supplementary material supplied the
commission for National Investors Corporation.
21. Government Report, op. cit
. ,
p. 20
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From value of fund as computed Yes No
above are deducted
Full lot brokerage 7 31
Odd lot premiums 3 35
Administrative fees 16 22
Estimated fees of custodians
or trustees 10 28
Taxes on unrealized appreciation 25 13
Other charges and liabilities 8 30
III A further deduction for a
redemption fee
Was provided in charter or
indenture
Was charged at 12/31/35
and payable to sponsor
and payable to company
20 18 (38)
17 21 (38)
8
9
IV The results per share figure is
adjusted to
nearest cent 17
next lower cent 3
next higher cent 2
nearest quarter 1
not adjusted 15
One striking similarity between the open-end
company and the closed-end concept is the question of
distribution.
The majority of open-end management companies
were sponsored by persons closely connected with the
subsequent distribution of their securities, and prac-
tically all of these companies were managed by the same
person. The contract between the open-end company and
the distributor generally reflected this close relation-
ship in their operation.
..
; 1 . :---J
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The primary feature of a typical contract is
that it gave the distributor the right to the exclusive
distribution of the investment company’s securities but
did not require any commitment on the distributor’s part.
In other words, the distributor had an agency for the
distribution of the company’s shares in return for a
specified commission equal to the amount of the load.
An analysis of the sale of $440,000,000 of the
security issues of thirty-nine open-end investment com-
panies during the 1927-1935 period indicates that 70$
were affected by the distributors as agents for these
companies while only 30$ were affected with the distrib-
22
utors as principals. However, a growing tendency has
existed during the past few years for the distributors
to act as principals.
23
Harwood and Blair, ^ say that members of the in-
dustry attribute this to two factors: first, the fear
that an underwriter's liability under the Securities Pet
of 1933 may be imposed upon the dealers when the prin-
cipal distributor acts only as an agent and, second, the
possible liabilities which may be imposed upon the in-
vestment companies as principals by virtue of
22. Government Report, Ibid., p. 31
23. Harwood, E. C., end Blair, Investment Trusts and
Funds from Investors’ Point of View (Cambridge:
American Institute for Economic Research, 1937)
,
p. 81
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misrepresentation which may he made by the principal
distributor, as agent, in connection with the sale of
the shares.
Certain aspects in connection with the distribu-
tion of open-end shares makes this field lucrative for
dealers for the distribution of open-end company shares
and constitutes a continuing business; the dealers'
spread or commission is at least as high as on other
types of securities.
The existence of the open-end investment company
depends upon the sale of its shares in a highly competi-
tive market, which it usually acouires through a large
nationwide dealers' organization. Calvin Bullock had a
total of about two thousand dealer outlets over the
country, of which seven or eight hundred have been ac-
24
tive at a given time.
Since these dealers handled two or three compet-
ing trusts, dealer good-will was of the utmost importance.
The dependence of open-end investment companies
upon numerous dealers for distribution of their shares
discouraged any effort to supervision or restriction of
the dealers' trading activities. The relationship be-
tween Calvin Bullock and his dealers was stated in the
24. Keene's Manual of Investment Trusts, 1938
t. o *
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prospectus of Dividend Shares, Inc., dated July 23,
25
1938 .
Mahlon Q. Taylor, president of Massachusetts
Distributors, Inc., stated that some effort was made by
this company to select the dealers for the sale of
shares of Massachusetts Investors Trust and Supervised
26
Shares, Inc.
Prom the material just presented it may be con-
cluded that open-end companies are dependent, to a cer-
tain extent, upon dealers for the good-will of the com-
pany and the sale of shares of that open-end company.
This method of distributing investment trust
shares does not differ greatly from the practices of
any company, industrial or otherwise, in the process
of selling their shares to the investing public.
The foregoing study for the investor has cov-
ered merely the open-end management company. Now at-
tention should be drawn to the closed-end management
company, along the same line of study pursued in regard
to the open-end company.
The period from 1926 to the end of 1929
was the era of principal organization
and expansion of closed-end management
companies -- investment trusts that
offered no continuing plan for the sale
25. Dividend Shares, Inc., Prospectus
,
July 1938
2b. Government Report, op. c i t
. , p . 35
<.
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or redemption of their own shares. The
1929 market collapse virtually ended the
public offerings of securities of closed-
end management trusts because these shares
began to sell in the market at prices be-
low asset values rather than at prices
above asset values, at which many invest-
ment comoany issues had previously been
selling.
These closed-end company securities were dis-
tributed in any one or more of the following ways:
(1) Public offerings.
(2) Private offerings and sales to bankers
or sponsors.
(5) Offering to stockholders.
(4) Inter-company sales and exchanges.
(5) Offerings through options.
(6) Gifts, bonuses and stock dividends.
By far the most common metnod of distribution
employed by closed-end management companies was the
public offering: " ... sales to the public generally
through the means of underwriting syndicates and retail
distributors." This type of distribution accounted for
$2,242,000,000, or 55$ of the total value of stocks and
bonds sold by all closed-end trusts during the 1927-
,
28
1935 period.
27. Government Report, op. eft., p. 92
28. Ibid.
,
p. 93
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Another method of marketing the stock issues
of closed-end management trusts was through private
offerings ... sales to ‘'selected lists" of persons.
Shares valued at approximately $176,000,000,
including inter-company transactions, were
distributed by this method during the 1927-
1955 period, while $167,000,000 of secur-
ities were sold to sponsoring investment
bankers, banks and others directly with-
out public offering. These two forms of
placing (private offerings and sales to
the bankers) accounted for Q% of the total
security sales of closed-end investment
trusts and investment companies
.
The Government Report states further that
"almost 25^, or over $40,000,000 of the total shares
sold by private offerings was paid not with cash but
with securities which went into the portfolios of the
issuing trusts or companies."
In addition to the previous mentioned methods
30
of public and private offerings $252,000,000" of secur-
ities were sold by closed-end companies through offer-
ings to their own stockholders.
The small amount of stock sold in this manner
was probably due to the fact that few closed-end trusts
had been established long enough prior to 1929 market
crash to attempt any expansion in this matter.
29. Government Report, loc . ci
t
.
30. Ibid., p. 35
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Inter-company sales during the same period
(1927-1955) amounted to $1,200,000.^
The next method of distribution used by these
trusts was that of granting option warrants. Long-
term option warrants -- securities evidencing the right
to subscribe to or otherwise gain stock at a specified
price during a certain period of time — were used to
"sweeten" the various issues and thereby aiding the
distribution.
Now that a review has been given of the methods
of distribution, a search into the underwriting profits
and benefits will give the potential investor a clearer
insight into the costs of closed-end trusts.
The fact that so many closed-end trusts were
sponsored by persons or firms engaged in the investment
banking business would give rise to the theory that the
sponsorsnip was due in part to the desire for profits.
Any attempt at a statistical analysis of the sponsorship
of closed-end trusts is complicated by the variety of
businesses conducted or controlled by the sponsors.
Consequently, only general classifications of the dom-
inant management groups by the government has been made.
51. Government Report, loc. cit.
~
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As of December 31, 1929, ~ out of a total of 162
closed-end management investment trusts and investment
companies, 109 were sponsored principally by houses of
issue, bank affiliates, brokers and dealers. In other
words, during the period of greatest expansion approx-
imately two-thirds of these investment companies were
dominated by sponsors whose principal business activ-
ities involved the distribution of securities. Such
underwriters and investment bankers as Dillon Read &
Company, and Bonbright and Company, have constantly
engaged in the business of sponsoring closed-end in-
vestment companies.
In the underwriting of securities of an invest-
ment company sponsored by investment bankers and secur-
ity dealers the sponsors could determine all policies
and practices of the trust. Few closed-end company
charters contained any restrictions upon their activ-
ities and powers. The charters centralized the power
in the sponsors, who made up the officers, the directors,
the executives and other committees.
The greatest benefit gained by the investment
bankers from closed-end investment trusts was the amount
and character of compensation they should receive for
underwriting the issues of such companies. This
32. Government Report, op. ci
t
.
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comp 6ns at ion took many forms, such, as cash, option war-
rants, and free stock. The House Investigation
Committee ^ discovered that out of a total of 204 pub-
lic offerings through the aid of bankers during 1927-
1935, options were given to bankers in fifty-three cases
and securities were given in three cases. This practice
was particularly widespread in 1928 and 1929 when bank-
ers received options in 53 out of 138 issues, including
31 out of 51 common stock issues.
The cash compensation based upon published load
34
charge^ was itself a sizeable amount
. It was reported
by 153 closed-end companies that they paid §116,519,000
for the marketing of their securities for a total of
§2,109,000,000 so that the selling load averaged about
5.5$ of the offering price and 5.8$ of the net proceeds
to the investment companies.
Furthermore, such loads were sometimes computed
upon shares sold upon part-paid bases, the unpaid bal-
ances of which were subject to cancellation, while the
possibility of pyramiding selling commissions through
inter-company holdings, without adding any new money
to the industry, also presented itself.
33. House of Representatives, H.R. 10065
34. House Document No. 70, 76th Congress
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When the cost of financing the closed-end trust
securities is considered by a person interested in
management trusts the first question to come to mind
might well be w Is the cost to the company and subse-
quently to the holder, worth the investment?"
Let us consider for a moment an investment
trust attempting to sell its securities without the
aid of an investment banker. The securities to be
sold are comparatively unknown in a market glutted
with well-known securities. If this trust was to at-
tempt to sell its shares directly to the public few
sales would be- effected regardless of how worthwhile
the shares might be. The biggest competition the com-
pany would be forced to face would obviously be the
large known companies whose shares are on the market
and the fact that they are selling an unknown issue of
securities
.
As has been pointed out in relatively few in-
stances, the organizers and managers of investment trusts
have, themselves, met all costs incidental to organiza-
tion, and to the raising of initial capital. "In one
company additional stock authorized has always been of-
fered to existing stockholders on a preferential basis,
any part of the issue not taken up being underwritten
and paid for at the offering price by the banking firm
..
'
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which has sponsored the company. No bonus stock has
been issued, no commissions have been paid, and no part
of the organization expenses has been taken from the
company’s funds.”" This means that the price paid by
the subscribers for new issues has been put into the
company without any deductions whatever. This differs
rather radically from the occasional practice of fixing
a certain price for an issue of stock which is turned
over at this figure to a selling group which then adds
its commission percentage in determining the public
offering price.
Up to this point the author has really not dis-
tinguished clearly between open-end trusts and closed-
end trusts with the exception of pointing out the costs
of each and the hold sponsors have on the various com-
panies. In the final analysis, what must the investor
look for in either concept?
The ultimate of any open-end trust is to become
a closed-end trust for, once the trust discontinues the
offering of stock issues and takes away the redemption
privileges, the trust becomes a closed-end company.
The advantages presented to the investor in an open-end
company are many. The investor at any time has a market
35. Robinson, L. R., Investment Trusts, Organization
and Management (New York: Ronald Press, 1929), p. !c243
..
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for his securities in that he may turn them hack to the
company at their liquidating value, less a redemption
charge. Any holder of these trust securities may feel
that a market is being maintained for his shares as the
company is under obligation to redeem the holdings.
In certain cases, open-end trusts stopped sell-
ing their shares where they attained a size deemed ade-
quate by their manager, yet the redemption provisions
of those companies are still operative and, although
repurchases may be made in only small amounts, even-
tually they will liquidate if selling is not resumed.
In regard to the closed-end company only one
statement is necessary to distinguish it from an open-
end company. In a closed-end trust redemption privil-
eges do not exist.
In this chapter the author has attempted to
elucidate for the potential investor the costs inherent
in investment trust securities. Also shown in this
chapter are the differences, however slight, between
the open-end concept and the closed-end concept. The
author feels that the reader should, if possible, draw
his own conclusions on this section.
There is one fact that should be cited. The
potential investor should not be concerned to any great
-.
.
•
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extent over the cost to the trust for issuing securities.
The cost here is very necessary. As has been shown, no
company, no matter how strong financially, can hope to
market its wares if the company is unknown.
The investor, when reviewing a company, should
note, if possible, the cost of issuing, and from this
determine the cost to him per share. In some cases it
would be high, and then the investor should further in-
vestigate the company.
In the next chapter will be shown some of the
problems connected with the investing of investment trust
funds
.
s,
'
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CHAPTER IV
INVESTMENT PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
The preceding chapters have dealt largely with
the concepts of management trusts, the importance of
management, the costs to trusts of issuing securities,
and the relationship between investment trusts end the
sponsors of these trusts. With this study completed it
is now possible to discuss the use of the acquired funds
in the purchase of securities and, if possible, to arrive
at certain standards resulting from the experience of
American institutions.
Management trusts are built upon the theory that
a well selected and diversified group of common stocks
will tend to enhance in value over a number of years and,
in the long run, afford a safe and more profitable in-
vestment than bonds.
Several studies made in recent years have
undertaken to analyze the comparative In-
vestment value over a period of time of
common stocks, preferred stocks, and bonds.
The law of increasing stock values states
that over a period of years the principal
value of a well diversified holding of the
common stocks of representative corporations.
1. Robinson, L. R., 0£. clt . , p. 250
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in essential industries, tends to increase
in accordance with the operation of com-
pound interest.
In the selection of securities for investment, we
must consider more than the expected income yield upon
the amount invested, and may quite properly weigh the
probability of principal enhancement over a term of years
without departing from the most conservative viewpoint.
There seems to be little doubt in the author’s
mind that if the investment trusts use reasonable care
in purchasing securities from producers who are enjoying
or have the prospect of enjoying social demand for their
products, and if participations are widely enough diver-
sified, common stocks make very desirable investments.
How fully the laws just presented will be borne
out in other industrial countries is open to speculation
but, as Robertson points out,
The position of common stocks as long-term
investments rests upon three chief factors --
whether commodity prices tend upward or down-
ward and while, if they tend downward, the
otherwise depressing effect can be overcome
by reducing production and thereby stimulat-
ing sales more than in proportion; and
whether the productive and distributive
forces of the nation are in an era of basic
expansion. 3
2. Loc . cit .
,
p. 250
3. TETd., p. 251
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It is obvious that if these factors are favorable --
as they have been in the United States, and seem to now
again have that tendency -- common stocks will prove over
the next decade or so a most profitable investment.
At this point only basic theories are being dis-
cussed and no attempt is being made to forecast coming
events. However, later in the thesis various phases of
the world situation will be discussed in relation to the
future of investment trusts.
The following important factors have been stressed
4by students of investment trusts.
(1) There should be enough capital in the fund
to allow the representation of several industries
and a considerable number of different issuers in
the portfolio. The possibilities of declining
earnings in one industry or unsound finances of
one company will then almost certainly be out-
weighed by uptrend developments in other indus-
tries and other companies. This is provided that
previously mentioned principles are borne in mind.
(2) There should be continuous supervision for
the purpose of readjusting the common stock hold-
ings from time to time. These changes will be in
4. Loc. cit., p. 251
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accordance with the changing prospects in dif-
ferent industries and different companies.
Technological change should be constantly noted
by supervisors of investment trusts; production
variation should be watched.
(5) There should be due regard given to the
proper time for purchasing common stocks, it be-
ing almost axiomatic that short-term maturities,
or bonds, under certain circumstances, offer a
better temporary employment of capital funds.
It is for this reason that many trusts special-
izing in common stocks generally leave to their
managers much leeway in buying obligations, or
short-term maturities, or employing their funds
in time deposits or call loans. Investment
Managers Company, whose restrictions on invest-
ment apply primarily to the common stocks, which
it normally expects to hold, place fewer limita-
tions upon the management as to purchases of
bonds or notes during such periods as it may
decide it is inopportune for the acquisition
of common stocks.
(4) An attempt should be made to purchase
stocks at reasonable levels.
:•
.
-
I
*•
'
.
.
.
*
L
.
^ *
.
.
In view of the four axioms mentioned a re-
view of these principles, using examples, might aid
in classification.
An investment trust Is organized with a paid-
in capital of $100,000 for the purpose of investment
in common stocks. The management decides to place 90%
of the fund into industrials, and maintain 10$ of the
fund in cash. Assuming a purchase of shares in com-
panies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, E, I, all being industrial
with a favorable outlook under existing circumstances:
assuming a $10,000 purchase in each company, the bal-
ance sheet would be as follows:
Statement of Assets
December 5l, 19
Assets
Securities at market quotations $90,000
Cash in banks 10,000
In the course of events companies A, B and C have
changed their position and the Initial investment of
$10,000 in each company has declined 10, 5 and 8 re-
spectively. The balance sheet at this time would be:
Total $100,000
Statement of Assets
June TP
Securities at market quotations $87,700
Cash in bgnks
Total
10,000
$97,700
..
v
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This would show a net loss for the period of $2,300
which might not have happened if the fund had been
large enough when the initial loss had been suffered
to so balance the portfolio as to eliminate this loss.
This is a rather weak example but helps illustrate the
point. This same example might be used to show the
effect of having the money of the trust invested in
too few types of industrials where a loss to the one
industry would mean a loss to most of the companies in
that field.
If a trust's management is inactive there is
a very good possibility that some of the issues con-
tained in the portfolio will fall in value and conse-
quently weaken the asset position of the trust.
The example cited for the first principle may
very well apply here if we assume that the management
was not on the alert as to the values of the secur-
ities held in the trust's portfolios.
Today the policy of forecasting trends of
general business, trends of industries and particular
companies within the industry is accepted as the proper
technique for market transactions. Investment trusts
must be constantly analyzing the securities contained
in the portfolios. Companies whose securities are
owned must be carefully studied for such points as:
>
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its place in the cycle, the position of this partic-
ular company in regard to the industries cycle, its
past earnings, its possible future earnings, to name
a few.
An investment trust should purchase securities
at times when the immediate prospects of the market
and money rates allow for a wise purchase of the se-
curities.
In other words, while it is recognized that a
stock bought in 1937 at $70 may be expected to sell
at $80 in two years thereafter if prices reflect the
probable expansion in output and earnings; it is never
theless maintained that the purchase may be delayed if
technical market conditions extrinsic to the security
in question make probable a setback in price to $60
or $50 in the meantime.
Some investment trusts hold to the theory that
such a limited number of securities should be owned,
and that adequate distribution of risk can be attained
without leaving the confines of the United States or
investing in twenty, thirty, or forty issues.
"... their policy is to purchase solely,
or primarily, common stocks in leading
American industrial and public utility
enterprises and to make only such
changes in the composition of the
c% . J
' '
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portfolio as may be dictated by im-
portant developments or unusual in-
vestment opportunities elsewhere. 0
This type of investment trust firmly maintains
that a searching investigation should precede each pur
chase, the transaction being large enough to warrant a
very intensive study of the situation in individual
companies. Without attempting to increase income by
converting profits into cash in the normal process of
reinvestment these companies avoid trading and rely
upon growth and development of the companies whose
securities they hold.
In the main, majority of the investment trusts
of this company differ from the foregoing in the pol-
icies of investments. They hold to the theory that a
broad distribution of risk is a very important safety
factor in investment trusts and that diversification
of investments adequate for this purpose requires one
or more hundred different securities representing gov-
ernments, industrials, and public utilities, and gen-
erally, though not always, a portfolio containing
holdings from more than one country.
These companies determine their security pur-
chases by reference to the investment opportunities
5. Robinson, ojp. cit . , p. 254
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currently presenting themselves in the markets where
they are prepared to buy. When bond prices in cer-
tain countries, and for certain issues, seem cheap a
larger proportion of their resources will be found in
senior securities. When common stock prices, in view
of prospective earnings, dividends, book value, and
market trends seem reasonable, some senior securities
and preferred stock will be sold, the proceeds being
reinvested in common stock.
There will be occasions when the company will
consider it wise to withdraw from one security or
group of securities to reinvest elsewhere. Now profit
or loss becomes a reality. In the case where a profit
has been realized a conversion makes this a cash prof-
it; similarly, a loss in the holdings now ceases to be
a book loss and becomes actual and is deducted from
income
.
An investment trust company which is
under active management ... must often
be in position to make purchases on a
falling market. Many companies have
determined at what approximate average
price they would consider a given secur-
ity an advantageous "buy" and in order
to arrive at this end, have made initial
purchases on a somewhat higher level
than this average, holding themselves
in readiness to acquire more in event
of a reaction of prices. 6
6. Ibid., p. 256
.iv
.
V - - i • \ * - • ‘
• u <
.
.
’
•
...
•••• ' :
.
.
62
Where the corap any is concerned in many deal-
ings of this- nature, orders are occasionally on a "good
•til cancelled" basis, while sales orders on an upward
scale are frequently entered.
As a result of this method of operation many
companies find that it is of the utmost importance to
command funds on short notice, and not to rely exclu-
sively on temporary bank loans. Herein lies the rea-
son why ably managed investment trusts maintain a large
proportion of their holdings in readily marketable se-
curities, and when price reactions come about, are in
a strong liquid position.
To quote from a letter to its shareholders sent
out on April 16, 1928, by State Street Investment Trust:
During the period covered by this report
security prices have risen rapidly and
have now attained a level which in the
opinion of your management is danger-
ously high. In order to be in a posi-
tion to benefit by any decline in mar-
ket prices that may occur, we are now
holding somewhat over 20% of your funds
in cash and call loans .
.
Though this analysis was made thirteen years ago it
bears out the contention that at certain times it is to
7. State Street Investment Trust, 1928
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the trust's advantage to maintain much of its holdings
in cash and those securities easily converted into
cash.
To cite an occasion when an investment trust
felt that securities were more promising than cash a
quotation is taken from the 1939 annual report of
Massachusetts Investors Trust:
Throughout the year the trustees con-
tinued to maintain a substantially full
invested position in the belief that
securities were potentially more at-
tractive than cash.
By inference it may be concluded that this
investment trust pursues the policy of maintaining
large cash reserves when in the minds of the manage-
ment this is deemed the wisest course.
Barron's, of February 10, 1941, states: “Twelve
of the largest funds, for example, held about three
million more cash and United States securities
December 31, 1940, than they had a year previously.
However, all cash, bonds, and preferred holdings of
the twelve funds did not amount to quite 20 per cent
of total combined assets at the end of 1940. Thus
8. Massachusetts Investors Trust, Boston, Mass., 1939
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investment trusts are still primarily common stock
9
funds
.
In determining just what position the trust
should take In regard to its security holdings,
Robinson10 believes that three broad criteria should
be kept in mind in investment trust buying:
(1) The securities purchased must conform
to the norms of diversification which the com-
pany has set for itself.
(2) The securities must meet the trust’s
standards of intrinsic soundness.
(5) They should be obtained at figures
giving current yield and/or promise of cap-
ital appreciation, the range of maximum
prices set for various eligible securities
being based upon an expectation of ultimate
profitable turnover.
The first of these criteria assures the stock
holder in an investment trust that safety of his cap-
ital will be sought in the spreading of risk. This
9. Barron's Weekly, Feb. 10, 1941, p. 9.
Trusts used in this analysis: /dams Express,
American Investors, Incorporated Investors, Lehman
Corp., Mass. Investors' Quarterly Income Shares,
Selected Industries, State Street Investment Corp.
Tri-State and U.S. & Foreign Securities
10. Robinson, ojp. clt
. ,
p. 267
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first criteria may be summed up in one word; namely,
diversification. The second is an attempt to guaran-
tee the holder of trust shares a constant return re-
>
gardless of the trends in business. The third attempts
to secure for the holder the business profits which
ordinarily result from purchase and resale. If these
three axioms are adhered to the investment trust in-
vestor will have the approximate advantages of yield
and safety that may well be enjoyed by the most well-
informed investor who at any phase of the business
cycle is reaping profits from the capital invested.
The remainder of the chapter will be devoted
to further elucidation on the first of these prin-
ciples.
An obvious requirement in regard to diversi-
fication would be the provision of the effect that at
all times the investment trust should heve a minimum
of securities in the portfolio. This is not the com-
mon stipulation, however. The requirement that a min-
imum number of securities must be held does not in it-
self give assurance of distribution of risk. It would
be possible for a company to have, for example, 85$ of
its entire holdings in one security and the other 15$
scattered among 300 different investments, each held
...
.
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in very small quantities. For this reason standards
of diversification are generally expressed in other
ways. For example, in 1929 fifteen trusts required
that not more than 5$ of their total assets be invest-
ed in any one company, or security, and fourteen fixed
the maximum at 10$.
In some cases these restrictions apply to se-
curities, and in other cases, to issuers. It is appar-
ent that a provision that forbids investment of, let us
say, any more than 2$ of the assets in any one security
is entirely different from a limitation that states
that 2% must be the maximum of the resources invested
in any one issuer. As a given company may issue four
to six different classes of stocks and bonds it would
be possible under the first limitation to place 8 to
10$, or more. In securities of one issuing company
while, under the latter restriction, the maximum amount
to be invested in any one company is definitely limited.
This foregoing Is an illustration of what the
potential Investor must look for when considering sev-
eral investment trusts in which investors' money could
be placed.
In the quarterly report, as of September 7.0 ,
1940, Massachusetts Investors Trust lists under its
security holdings the percentage of stocks held in any
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division (such as automotive) and then gives percent-
i of this total for each individual
11
company.
Automotive (5.0$) $ of
Shares Company Market Market
21,000 Bendix Aviation Corp. 2lf 0.6
24,000 Chrysler Corp. 78 7/8 1.8
37,000 General Motors Corp. 49i 1.7
11,000 Libbey-Owens-Ford Corp. 43 0.5
5,500 U. S. Rubber Company 20-gr 0.1
3,500 U. S. Rubber Company
8$ Pfd. 76 0.3
Machinery (1.0$)
6,800 Draper Corp. 68^ 0.4
28,500 National Supply Co. 5 7/8 0.2
4,500 National Supply Co.
$2 Com. Pfd. 9 * —
6, 500 United Shoe Machinery Corp . 60g 0.4
At a glance an investor or potential investor
may note just what percentage of the total assets are
invested in any particular group and may also determine
what percentage is invested in any one group or groups
of securities of a particular company. This aids the
interested person in determining how wisely the re-
sources of the trust are invested. After a study of
the reports of the investment trust a glance at any
newspaper's financial page will allow the reader to
decide the value of the holdings.
11. Massachusetts Investors Trust, Boston, Mass.,
Sept. 30, 1940
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Many companies further limit the type of in-
vestment by requiring wide geographical distribution
of investments especially if the company goes outside
of the United States.
Following is a typical restriction cited from
an indenture between Second International Securities
Corporation end the Central Union Trust Company of New
York.
That of the total funds of the company
invested and available for investment,
not more than an aggregate of 55% will
at any time be invested in securities
originating in any one country other
than the United States. The term
"originating’ 1 is hereby defined for
the purposes hereof as meaning the
country in which the authority, cor-
poration or organization, issuing such
securities is incorporated or otherwise
organized or established, unless the
Board of Directors of the company are
of the opinion that because substan-
tially all of the assets or business
of a corporation or other organization
are located in some other country, such
securities should be considered as orig
inating in such other country. 12
These restrictions are similar to those adopted by
other companies in the field of investment trusts.
12. Second International Securities Corporation of
New York, Feb. 1, 1928
... c
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In the United States are to he found many com-
panies making it their policy to invest in American
common stock, but considerable leeway is generally
granted to the management as to the securities to be
purchased. Numerous trusts purchase bonds, short-term
maturities, loans and time deposits when the management
deems it advisable. Among investment trusts which aim
to employ their capital primarily, or wholly, in
American common stocks are as widely differing groups
as Massachusetts Investment Trust, Inland Investors,
Incorporated Investors, Shawmut Associates Investment
13
Company of America, to mention a few.
On the other hand, restrictions occur in cer-
tain companies which are designed to secure a balanced
holding between senior and junior securities. Certain
companies require at least half of the assets to con-
sist of evidences of indebtedness and that not more
than 10$ of the corporation’s paid-in capital shall be
invested in any one bond issue, and that not more than
5$ shall be invested in any one stock issue. The de-
termination of such ratios at any time is generally
left to the management whose decision must rest upon
14
market conditions and the money market.
13. The Investment Dealers Digest, New York City,
June 30, 1940
14. Manhattan Bond Fund pursues such a policy.
'>
: •
.
,
I ' .
.
.
- i
70
As might he exfjected, the larger part of
American investment trust capital rests in the secur-
ities of our country. There are, however, many notable
exceptions among companies constituted to operate on an
international basis, which have taken advantage of pur-
chasing opportunities throughout the world. Invest-
ments of International Equities Corporation of America
15have represented over thirty countries of origin.
security there are many American companies which spe-
cialize in given areas, industries or types of secur-
ities, and which do not aim to hold more than twenty
or twenty-five issues. What this type of company sur-
renders in protection, consequent upon a wide distri-
bution of risk, they endeavor to make up by a thorough
understanding and detailed checking of conditions in
some limited field of investment. Typical of this type
of company are the following:
As a further example of limitation by type of
Assets in
Millions
Aeronautical Securities
Incorporated
Air Investors Incorporated
American ElectrLc Securities
Corporation
Chain Store Investors Trust
829.000
945.000
527.000
122.000
15. Investment Dealers Digest, New York City
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In the main the companies dealing in a specific in-
dustry tend to he of minor importance in the trust
field. When the assets of special trusts are com-
pared with the company investing in a wide general
field the result hears out the contention that the
specific field has a limited opportunity in attract-
ing investors. The following chart 3hows the assets
of three companies having wide diversifications:
Assets in
Round Numbers
Massachusetts Investors Trust 100,000,000
Incorporated Investors 50,000,000
Lehman Corporation 70,000,000
The principle of distribution of risk, while
the very foundation of investment trust policy, should
not he carried further than the capacity of the staff
of analysists allows. Beyond a certain point the min-
imizing of risk involved in scattering holdings may
possibly he more offset by the difficulties met in
efficiently handling so complicated a portfolio. No
human being working within the bounds of time and energy
can possibly give attention to more than a limited num-
ber of securities although the advice of an alert board
of directors, and the organization of a competent sta-
tistical and research staff may, in the case of some
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investment trusts, enable the managers safely to carry
a very broad diversification.
In effecting the distribution, attention should
be paid to spreading the geographical risk, providing a
variety of obligors, governmental and industrial, and
assuming both proprietary and creditor positions by ac-
quiring both senior (bonds, preferreds) and junior
(common) securities.
There are other factors that will at times af-
fect portfolios; namely, political upheavels in certain
countries, or sections of our own country. A further
factor to be considered is the tendency of certain
forces that tend to make markets "bullish” or ’’bearish."
Different phases of the business cycle will affect dif-
ferently the claims to commodities represented in secur-
ities, and claims to money represented in bonds. In
order to profit from these well-known tendencies it is
not essential to carry on endless variety of invest-
ments, provided the various classes thus differently
affected are adequately represented.
:
•
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CHAPTER V
INVESTMENT PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (continued)
In the preceding chapter there were set forth
the policies of American investment trusts in the dis-
tribution of risk among their holdings. We shall now
consider some of the investment standards which have
been adopted to facilitate purchase of sound secur-
ities .
Restrictions concerning diversification of risk
are more numerous and exact than those aiming to estab-
lish conservative investment values at the time of pur-
chase. This must be so in the scheme of things because
standards regarding distribution of holdings may be
readily set up whereas the weighing of investment values
is a less mechanical process requiring a very intimate
knowledge of many different circumstances in the case
of each security considered; and incapable of reduction
to a set of rules.
The most exacting rules to be found among in-
vestment trusts take the form of limitation of invest-
ment to approved lists of securities which are published
and which, unless changed, definitely bind the manage-
ment’s discretion. Outstanding in the use of such a
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list is the Massachusetts Investors Trust whose trus-
tees are required to purchase stocks only from an ap-
proved list of securities published quarterly which
cannot be changed without first notifying the stock-
holders, Although it is expected that common stocks
will be the normal investment of this trust, it is sig-
nificant that no restrictions are placed upon the pur-
chase of bonds. In the statement for the quarter end-
ing September 30, 1940,” Massachusetts Investors Trust
serves notice that Westvaco Chlorine Products
Corporation has been added to the "approved list." It
further states that the addition of securities to the
"approved list" does not necessarily mean that the
trustees have decided to purchase these securities at
this time. The list is simply a method of telling the
stockholders the securities that the company believes
are sound,
Oenerally speaking, the better known the spon-
sors of any company, and the wider the public confidence
in their banking connections, the less the tendency to
apply restitutions of a very exacting nature.
1. Massachusetts Investors Trust Quarterly Statement,
Sept, 30, 1940
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The Investment Company Act of 1940 states in
Section 15, part 3:
No registered investment company shall,
unless authorized by the vote of a major-
ity of its outstanding voting securities,
deviate from its policy in respect of con-
centration of investments in any particu-
lar industry or group of industries as
recited in its registration statement,
or deviate from any fundamental policy
recited in its registration statement
pursuant to section 8 (6) (2). 2
Pew indeed are the instances in which invest-
ment trusts have confined themselves, either wholly or
in part, to securities of the "legal" groups. There
do not exist in the trust field the reasons justifying
such statutory limitations of their investments as is
commonly imposed in the United States upon savings
hanks, life insurance companies, and trustees, and it
would be practically impossible to operate a trust
profitably upon a basis of compulsory investment in
"legals .
"
There are many occasions where trusts purchase
legals of either a short or long-term maturity, either
to maintain a high degree of liquidity awaiting further
investment opportunities or to reap a profit during
periods of declining interest rates. But at such times
2. Investment Company Act, 1940, H.R. 10065
'.
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it is not the trustee aspect of the securities hut the
ready market they command, the maturities they command,
the maturities which they carry, and the type of secur-
ity they represent.
Investment trusts generally place the hulk of
their resources in securities listed on the leading
exchanges. The advantage of ready marketability is in
itself an important consideration, hut it is usually
the case that securities of established companies which
investment trusts would in any event he inclined to buy
are quoted and dealt in on the leading exchanged. Des-
pite the safety of purchasing only securities listed on
the various exchanges, it would he a short-sighted man-
agement which would limit investment to listed securi-
ties. It would altogether prevent investment in many
new industries and companies, and in issues of estab-
lished financial institutions, such as the majority of
our American hanks and insurance companies which enjoy
an over-the-counter market.
As it has long been an accepted invest-
ment trust function to ferret out invest-
ment opportunities and to give encourage-
ment to sound new enterprises by early
purchasing among their securities, cer-
tain useful and profitable functions
would be curtailed by requirements that^
purchases be confined to listed issues.’
3. Robinson, L.R., Investment Trust Organization and
Management (New York: Ronald Press, 1929), p. 287
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Restrictions of investments to "legals," or
authorized lists, of securities listed on one or more
of the exchanges are not as satisfactory as restric-
tions of a less artificial nature which point toward
ascertaining whether a proposed investment conforms to
certain soundness. .Among these less artificial re-
quirements are the factors concerning the age of the
security, the number of years over which data may be
secured concerning earnings, and book values of the
proposed holdings. Inland Investors, Incorporated,
had in its by-laws as of 1929, the following:
The company shall not invest in stocks
of corporations unless such corporations
shall have been in business for a period
of at least three years and shall have
paid dividends in not less than three
years upon the class of stock in which
it is proposed to invest (or upon any
class of stock for which the stock in
question may have been exchanged) . .
.
While it is commonly understood that an in-
vestment trust differs from a holding company in avoid-
ing any responsibilities of management or control aris-
ing from purchase of securities, there are but a few
instances of definite restrictions on investments aimed
at control.
Today the Investment Company Act tends to elim-
inate any possibility of an investment trust becoming a
tV-. - ::
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holding company. However, the section of the law
placing this restriction upon trusts is a matter of
interpretation. Section 15, part 4, states that no
registered investment company shall, unless authorized
hy a vote of a majority of its outstanding voting se-
curities, change the nature of its business so as to
4
cease to he an investment company.
Some trusts have gone so far as to place limi-
tations upon the amount of stock that the company may
hold in any one concern. A provision of this kind is
found in the by-laws of Inland Investors Corporation.
The provision reads:
The company shall not invest in the
stock of any corporation if thereby
the company would become the owner of
more than twelve and one-half per cent
(12^6 of the then outstanding voting
stock of such corporations).
These restrictions definitely preclude any in-
vestment for purposes of control. The restrictions
that companies have placed upon themselves plus the
possible interpretation of the law, today limit the
purpose of the trust to that phase of business pre-
viously decided upon.
4. Investment Company Act of 1940, p. 25
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In order to make effective any restrictions
as to investments some companies bind themselves with-
in a definite period of time to dispose of any security
which is found to he ineligible. If this is to be car-
ried out it means a careful periodic check of the en-
tire investment portfolios, without which no investment
requirements can be made really effective.
As investment trusts will often have occasion
to make short-term use of their resources in call or
time loans, time deposits, or near-dated maturities, it
is advisable that standards be adopted governing this
phase of investment trust financing. Today the
5Federal Government limits loans that a company may
make. This section makes it unlawful for investment
companies to lend money or property to any person if
(1) such loan is not authorized by the policies of the
company as recited in its registration statements and
reports filed with the Commission, or (2) the loan is
made to a person who controls or is under common con-
trol, with the Investing company. Exceptions are made
to the law for the renewal of loans outstanding prior
to March 15, 1940.
5. Ibid., p. 38, Sec. 21
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A combination of individual regulations by com-
pany policies and practices plus Government regulation
has done much to so encompass the trusts that, today,
illegal practices are few. It has been to the advan-
tage of companies which have prepared a course of honest
and intelligent practices in this field to have further
Federal regulation. The investment trust field in
America, as has been pointed out, is a comparatively
new endeavor and therefore much "wildcatting* has gone
on in the past. The companies in the field are realiz-
ing the advantage of a sane policy of regulations in all
matters concerning investment trusts.
In a summary prepared by Warren Motley, con-
densed for the Massachusetts Investors Trust, there is
set forth a statement which clearly outlines the rea-
sons for legislation:
The Investment Company Act of 1940,
which is the result of the collabora-
tion of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the leaders of the
investment company industry, seeks
to promote honest and effective manage-
ment and to prevent the recurrence of
isolated instances of wrongdoing and
practices contrary to the best inter-
ests of investors. These ends it
undertakes to achieve by the enforce-
ment of certain definite standards and
incidentally by the delegation to the
S.E.C. of limited administrative author-
ity, without interfering with the
..
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exercise of business judgment by those
who are charged with the duties and re-
sponsibilities of management.
^
Regulation is a natural outgrowth of practices
pursued by certain individuals, groups of individuals,
or companies. To a limited extent regulation has been
practiced for some time by a number of companies to
their advantage in that the limited restrictions have
built up in the public’s mind a feeling of security
concerning the company. There is no fear that the in-
dividual companies will so regulate themselves by rules
and by-laws as to hamper the primary purpose of the in-
vestment trust. The fear lies in Federal and state
regulation, for a law may be passed with such rigid
requirements that the initiative on the part of the
management investment trusts may be destroyed.
This fear need not be expressed in regard to
the Investment Company Act of 1940. Massachusetts
Investors Trust feels that this law is a constructive
piece of legislation, embodying principles that many
7trusts have long pursued.
A danger does exist today in regard to further
regulation by the Federal Government and various state
6. Ibid., p. 3
7. 65 quarterly Report, Mass. Investors Trust, p. 4
.. j •
.
.
82
governments. In these days of political infringement
on business the trend is toward further legislative
action against all business enterprise. With this in
mind the danger lies ahead if the government decides
to dictate further the actions of the investment trusts.
The mistake in future regulation may well be an attempt
to impose requirements on all trusts that are, in real-
ity, only applicable to a few. A further hazard in un-
wise legislation is the possibility that the public may
be encouraged to believe that organizations and man-
agers are properly conducting the business provided they
comply with the requirements and reports which are the
responsibility of the trusts, under all types of trust
regulation.
It is much too soon for any person to state
what the effects are or might be under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, but one thing is certain -- the
Federal Government has given itself the power to fur-
ther control the field of investment trusts.
Floyd B. Odium, president of Atlas
Corporation, saysj
Restriction and regulation of private
business by the Government is justified
when necessary in the public Interest.
But it should not be introduced except
when public interest requires, and even
..
.
'
.
.
.
.
83
then, should leave private business as
free as public interest permits,®
Let this statement be a guide to future at-
tempts at legislation not only in regard to the invest-
ment trust field but any phase of business that has
long been called free enterprise.
Investment trust portfolios may be regarded in
one of two ways; namely, its composition at any one
time; and its changing composition over a period of
time. At any specific time the holdings should con-
form to the standards previously mentioned -- diversi-
fication, representation of sound investments. The
management should be constantly on the alert to main-
tain the standards of the trust. Many times the port-
folio of a trust must of necessity be altered to meet
changing conditions of the market, and other factors
having a bearing on trust portfolios.
The business of the investment trust is, as the
name implies, investing, and not speculation, and its
main source of income is the yield on its portfolio.
However, the market varies from time to time in the
same place and in different places at different times.
8. General Statement and Recommendations on Investment
Trust Legislation, July 2, 1937
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and these changes should he constantly studied with a
view to strengthening the investment position and in-
creasing the return. The sales of securities whose
price is a substantial gain over cost is termed "profit-
making." The selling of investments netting smaller re-
turns in order to go into the market to purchase secur-
ities having a great yield may also be termed "profit-
making" with a thought to the future sale of these
newly acquired issues.
As Robinson says, "From whatever angle we choose
to view the turnover policies of investment trusts, it
must be recognized that they are important in the man-
Q
agement of the investment portfolio."
In regard to portfolio sales and purchases, as
mentioned on the previous page, an investment trust is
somewhat similar to an Individual or group of individ-
uals managing an estate.
The difference between an investment trust and
a managed estate is that the former continual watching
guards against extreme depreciation among investments,
even though its watchfulness Is consistently diverted
toward adjustments on a higher plane of appreciation.
9. Robinson, o£. cit . , p. 50b
. n it .t
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Provided the investment trust* s holdings are essen-
tially sound, it has less worry concerning temporary
depreciation of its holdings than does the manager of
an estate, for the trust generally has capital to in-
vest to advantage in a falling market. While purchas-
ing in a falling market a well diversified portfolio
will still allow the declaration of dividends. A
trust differs from a marginal purchaser in that the
trust is under no necessity of providing extra funds
at an unexpected turn of the market. Its capital and
its business being that of investing funds, the trust
faces no unforeseen demands for liquid capital and no
threats of liquidation. The trust, unlike other types
of business, may hold its shares for a swing of the
market to the "bull” side.
Very often a trust will operate at a complete
reversal to the actions of the security-buying public.
In a period where the average investor is buying in
anticipation of a further rise the trust may sell the
shares it holds and thus make a profit; at a period
when defeatism prevails, and the timid investors are
leaving the market the trust may purchase the deflated
securities and hold them for a rise. An investment
trust is in a position to do this in view of the fact
that its capital is usually large enough to "ride out"
a depressed market.
-.
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The very difficulties that the average investor
must meet, and often is defeated hy, are many times the
very situations that the investment trust may use to
appreciate their holdings. In order to give applica-
tion to these principles, there may now be considered
the several factors which offer investment trusts its
opportunities for investment profit. These factors are:
nursing investments, the factors of age in securities,
the factor of risk.
Nursing of investments by trusts does not imply
that trusts should hold declining securities to the
point where a heavy loss is inflicted. It does, how-
ever, mean that a trust should constantly be on the
alert to take steps to protect its investment.
It is very often true that the public is fright-
ened out of an issue by the falling price or "scare"
statements published in the newspapers. This is due to
the lack of knowledge that the public has in regard to
many, if not all, companies. While the market is fall-
ing the trust may ha/e knowledge of the soundness of
the company and, with this in mind, as well as the
thought of protecting its investment already in the
company, it will purchase the securities in anticipa-
tion of a rise.
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Between the value for new Issues placed on se-
curities by a relatively uninformed public and the
value placed on this same issue by companies who are
well informed there is often a considerable spread. If
the issue is sound fundamentally the process of ” season-
ing” which results in a broader market, frequently en-
hances the price of the security out of proportion to
any gain either in income or safety of the issue. Many
investment trusts, when, after a careful analysis, they
feel that a new security will, in time, enhance its
value, purchase these new securities at the time of
underwriting, or purchase them from underwriters at a
price below the set price when, for some reason or
other, the new issue was not grasped by the public.
Previous to 1914 many British investment trusts
purchased new American securities on the London markets
at a price far below the price the security deserved.
In time, as is common knowledge, many of these securi-
ties increased in value and added rich profits to the
British trusts.
This is not an argument that investment trusts
should have intimate connections with issuing houses or
be interested primarily in new issues. The opposite is
more likely to be the case. But when an opportunity
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arises and the management feels certain that this new
issue will prove profitable the trust should purchase
these securities and hold them for a rise.
One of the main reasons why nev; issues are so
frequently undervalued when compared with "seasoned”
securities, other things being equal, is the element
of risk which tends to devaluate the security. An in-
vestment trust should be in a position to determine
exactly the risk that will be involved. Included in
this determination should be the economic cycle, and
the general trend. This study may work both ways. It
may result in purchases when market prices are low and
out of proportion to any risk involved. The study al-
so enables the management to avoid the losses involved
in purchasing overvalued "legals.”
Many arguments may, of course, be raised in
opposition to the idea of the author that investment
trusts work well in theory but in practice they are
highly unworkable. In their book Security Analysis ,
Graham and Dodd attack the investment trust by saying:
Most paradoxical was the early abandon-
ment of research and analysis in guiding
investment trust policies. How these
financial institutions owed their very
existence to the new philosophy, it was
natural and perhaps only just that they
should adhere closely to it. Under its
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canons investment had now become so beauti-
fully simple that research was unnecessary
and elaborate statistical data a mere in-
cumbrance. The investment process con-
sisted merely of finding prominent com-
panies with a rising trend of earnings
and then buying their shares regardless
of price ... Investment trusts actually
boasted that their portfolios consisted
exclusively of the active and standard
(most popular and highest priced) common
stocks
The authors of this book undoubtedly have made
a very good point in regard to the laxity of the in-
vestment trusts concerning methods of investments. The
period which the authors are citing includes the 1928-
1929 era. At this time, as is common knowledge, all
caution was thrown to the winds, not only by invest-
ment trusts but by large corporations, savings banks,
and commercial banks, to mention a few. The fault was
not with the trusts alone. Every type of business ex-
pected an everlasting boom in securities prices and
acted accordingly. It was a period where reason and
logic were cast aside for the desire to make profits.
Small investors who had never before dealt in securi-
ties bought shares on margin and amassed a fortune in
paper profits. Industrialists placed surplus funds of
10. Graham & Dodd, Security Analysis (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1940)
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their corporations into the market in order to increase
the profits of the business. No matter where one turned
during the boom period of 1928 to 1929 people were in-
vesting in the stock market. Overexpansion and other
factors gave rise to a boom unknown in our previous fi-
nancial history. With all this in mind it is hardly pos-
sible to take this period as a criterion of the function-
ing of an investment trust.
From the experience suffered in the crash of 1929
has come new regulations regarding the trusts. These
regulations have been self-imposed and in 1940 imposed
by the Federal Government, Another result of this "burst-
ing bubble" has been a more cautious attitude and more
carefully laid plans regarding investments.
It might be well at this point to study what the
investment trusts have done in the past year concerning
the securities they have bought and sold. It will also
be of interest to note the rise or fall of their cash
position. The defense program and the war will naturally
have no small effect upon trusts whose holdings are diver-
sified. The Massachusetts Investors Trust, in their
quarterly report ending September 30, 1940, states:
Our defense program is gradually getting
under way with the placing of numerous
orders for a great variety of materials.
With a number of durable goods industries
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operating at capacity and with increas-
ing employment payrolls stimulating de-
mand for consumers 1 goods, it is antic-
ipated that industrial activity will he
maintained for the balance of the year.
So long as the war abroad continues,
and the German blockade fails to inter-
rupt exports to England our industrial
expansion will be aided by British or-
ders placed here. 11
Prom this report it may be seen that the trusts
feel that their position will be enhanced by the defense
program now under way.
The investment trusts have been constantly
changing their portfolios to meet the changes in demand,
and increased desirability of certain issues.
During most of 1940 investment trusts
were selling common stock on balance,
though not by a very wide margin. Cash
holdings on the average were somewhat
greater at the end of the year than at
the beginning, and in addition, there
was a considerable increase in the amount
of preferred stocks and probably a slight
increase in the amount of bonds held by
many trusts. Most of the bonds and pre-
ferred stocks bought during 1940, fur-
thermore, were of the type which suggests
that investment trust managements were
seeking appreciation opportunities in
new fields rather than more stable in-
vestments
.
^
11. Massachusetts Investors Trust Quarterly Report,
Sept. 1940
12. Barron's Weekly, Feb. 10, 1941, p. 9
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TABLE III15
FOURTH QUARTER PORTFOLIO CHANGES
OF MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT TRUSTS
Number of
Trusts
Buying
Shares
Bought
Stocks in Which
Buyers
Predominated
Number of
Trusts
Selling
Shares
Sold
7 17,800 U. S. Steel 5 4,000
7 7,500 North American 6 10,400
5 2,400 Eastern Airlines 1 200
5 2,900 American Gas & Elec . 4 3,300
4 25,900 Greyhound 0 0
4 11,000 Standard Oil, N.J. 0 0
4 4,315 Am. Cyanamid Conv. Pfd. 0 0
4 4,000 Continental Oil 3 6,000
4 3,400 Chesapeake & Ohio 4 3,080
3 18,400 Penn. R.R. 1 100
O 11,500 Bethlehem Steel 3 2,900
3 7,900 General Motors 3 2,500
3 3,900 Allied Chem. & Dye 2 1,000
3 5,000 Texas Corp. 2 900
4,400 National City Bank 0 0
4,400 Am. Rad. & Stand. Soc. 1 200
3 1,700 Dow Chemical 1 300
3 1,100 Nat'l Paper & Power Pfd. 1 500
2 20,000 Paramount Pictures 0 0
13. Baron's Weekly, loc . clt
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This chart will help to bring out the conten-
tion of Barron’s Weekly, that investment trusts were
purchasing shares for an appreciation opportunity.
Every one of the companies represented on this
chart will profit from the defense program. Of partic-
ular importance is United States Steel Corporation, be-
ing the largest producer of steel in this country, and
having a tremendous backlog of orders for the govern-
ment. This company, however, has always been a favorite
of the trusts.
Pennsylvania Railroad is another company that
will increase its return due to the defense program.
This road has, for many years, carried approximately 10$
of all freight handled by American railroads. From this
it is obvious that this railroad is in a position to de-
clare profits from the increased traffic it will carry.
Another issue worthy of mention is the Eastern
Airlines Corporation. Though this company has never
paid any dividends its place is such in the market that
a rise in price may come at any time.
In the table just presented notice should be
taken of the fact that of the nineteen companies on the
chart only three (Paramount Pictures, National City
Bank, and Greyhound) are somewhat removed from indus-
tries that are directly in line for defense orders.
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The appreciation opportunity is, or will be,
undoubtedly present for the industrials concerned with
defense
,
A chart has been prepared by Barron’
s
x<
* to show
the companies in which the trusts were unloading their
holdings. In this list the majority of the issues sre
connected only indirectly with the defense program.
14. Barron's Weekly, loc, clt
.

TABLE III (continued)
Number of
Trusts
Selling
STOCKS
Shares
Sold
IN WHICH SELLERS PREDOMIN/.TED
Number of
Trusts
Buying
Shares
Bought
8 15,000 Chrysler 4 2,700
7 9,300 Kennecolt Corp. 4 7,500
6 13,200 Cons. Edison, N.Y. 1 2,000
6 11,300 Montgomery Ward 4 2,200
6 8,000 Phelps Dodge 0 0
5 16,200 General Electric 2 5,500
5 4,600 International Nickle 0 0
5 2,950 Alum. Co. of Amer. 0 0
5 2,600 Du Pont de Mamours 0 0
5 2,000 Bendix Aviation 2 15,700
4 5,900 J. C. Penny 0 0
4 8,500 Westinghouse Elec. 1 1,000
4 3,900 Allis Chalmers 3 2,200
4 2,600 Douglas Aircraft 0 0
4 2,300 Sears Roebuck 2 1,600
4 2,900 Southern Pacific 0 0
3 10,100 Commonwealth - Edison 3 1,128
3 7,000 Climax Moly. 2 900
3 3,900 Glenn Martin 2 1,000
T 3,900 Deere & Company 1 1,000
3 2,800 United Aircraft 0 0
..
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Of course this is a rather general conclusion
when one notes some of the companies whose securities
are being sold by investment trusts. Notable among
these exceptions is Chrysler Corporation. The reason
here seems to be that many trusts are reducing, though
not eliminating, their holdings in high-priced auto
stock while other funds were being added to their port-
folios. The same reason may be applied to Bendix
Aviation Corporation.
The only large group of common stocks in which
investment trust buying appears to have outweighed sell-
ing in 1940 is the steel group. More auto equipments
are held now than a year ago, but this is due largely
to a single security -- Bendix Corporation, of which
several large purchases were made by two companies whose
combined sales amounted of 15,700 shares. While this
large purchase was completed by the two trusts, five
companies had unloaded two thousand shares.
The ship-building representation in trust port-
folios has increased many times: it was practically non-
existent a year ago. Here also the trusts are taking
the appreciation opportunities presented by the defense
program, and especially the contracts that have been
awarded to the ship-building industry.
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During the period from June 30 to December 30,
1940, Bath Iron Works holdings had increased 5,000
shares, which had been purchased by the Chicago
Corporation. From June 30 to December 30, 1940,
Newport News Shipbuilding net increase in trust port-
folios was 29,226 shares. The purchases had been made
by the following companies
:
Name of Company Number of Shares
Purchased
Adams Express 5,600
American International 6,700
Chicago Corporation 16,800
Tri-Continental and Selected Ind. 126
Total 29,226
The cash position of a trust is often the clue to
the management's belief in the future of securities. It
is axiomatic that when management feels that securities
in general are rather dubious as investments for profit,
a shift in the portfolio is made to a cash position.
Specialized Financial Research Service conducted a re-
search into six investment trusts’ cash positions, with
Dow Jones averages, through 1939 and 1940. The companies
studied were: Lehman Corporation, State Street Investors
Trust, Loomls-Sayles, Broad Street Investment Corporation,
15
Incorporated Investors, Massachusetts Investors Trust.
15. Specialized Financial Research Service, Boston,
Mass., 1940
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June 50, 1959
3 trusts Good cash position
3 trusts Smaller cash position
Dow Jones averages 130
September 30, 1959
3 trusts Show decrease in cash or increased
holdings in securities
3 trusts Increasing cash position
Dow Jones averages 4 major in quarter
High 155.92 quarter closed with market again
Low 131.33 about half way to another high side
December 50
,
1959
3 trusts Starting to increase cash position
3 trusts Still getting into a better cash
position
Dow Jones averages 2 major moves in
,
quarter
High 155.48 Quarter closed with market again
Low 145.69 about half way bewteen moves -- on
upward side
March 31, 1940
6 trusts Decidedly heavy increase in cash
positions by most of the six trusts
Dow Jones averages 2 moves in quarter
but in narrower range
High 152.80
Low 144.65
June 10, 1940 Dow Jones Average -- Made a low of 110.41
almost three months after the trusts had
shown decided increase in cash position
or a lessening of security holdings.
June 50,1940 2 trusts still showed Increase in cash
position but in a smaller percentage than
previous quarter.
4 trusts evidently had taken advantage of
good cash position to pick up securities
at the low prices of June
High 124.42
low 119.73
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During the second quarter shown on the chart the
changes in portfolio holdings depict uncert sinties and
varying opinions. This was due, in part at least, to
the immense problems that faced people with money to in-
vest; the corporation, the investment trust, or the in-
dividual investor. Never before has the investor faced
the problems that he is forced to face today: can England
defeat Germany; will the Government close the stock ex-
change in case of war; will the totalitarian powers con-
tinue to disrupt the economic scheme of things; will
foreign selling of American securities be resumed and
where will the pressure show itself; war or peace in the
United States?
In the past year investment trust managers have
had the fact of the threat to invade England, the cer-
tainty of a large defense program, the knowledge that
taxes in 1941 will be over two billion greater than in
1940, that there is existing in Europe a food shortage.
Since 1940 there has been a wide divergence in
investment trust opinion concerning the market. We find
that Adams Express reported cash and equivalent, as of
March 1939, as 14# of its total assets, but three months
later this was down to 7.05# (September 30, 1940, 7#).
As of December 30, 1940, this item was up to 10.3#.
General American had only 5.7# of its fund in liquid
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form at the end of the first quarter of 1939, but by-
June 30, had increased its holdings of cash and equiv-
alent to 19.4$ of total assets (as of September 30,
1940, 14.9$). As of December 30, 1940, 13.2$ of its
total assets were in the form of cash or its equivalent.
Massachusetts Investors Trust had a slight increase in
cash and equivalent, as did Lehman, but State Street and
1
6
Chicago reported small decreases in cash and equivalent.
It is apparent that the managers of many trusts
were greatly perplexed during the last months of 1940.
Caution seems to be the important factor to these man-
agers; therefore, the most obvious development was in
increase in cash. While the average increase was only
1.1$ six investment trusts showed marked increases in
their cash position. The shift in holdings was to pre-
ferreds in many portfolios. Jackson and Curtis, in their
study, say: "... there was a 10^$ increase in this class-
ification of holdings over the last quarter of 1940,
17
while the increase in bonds was not as pronounced."
The trends of investment trusts have been a
striving to improve the quality of their stocks while at
the same time to increase their cash position to a mod-
erate degree. This increased cash position seems to
16. Figures for .1940 taken from a study made by Jackson
and Curtis, Boston, Mass., Feb. 24, 1941
17. Loc. cit.
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indicate that the managers are either uncertain as to
the future of the security market or they are anticipat-
ing a further drop in what is now a very sluggish market.
The future of the American investment trusts de-
pends upon a number of factors. The majority of the
trusts known today have never weathered a war. What ef-
fect a prolonged war would have on these financial insti-
tutions is unknown. If the Government, in time of con-
flict, should close the exchanges of the country it would
mean a freezing of the assets of the trusts.
A further question has entered the field. Many
trusts have become known as "orphan trusts" or trusts in
which, each year, the size of the trust shrinks; each
year the cost of management rises to a greater percent-
age; each year the shareholder who invested with a rea-
sonable hope that healthy management would continue to
declare profits sees the prospect of a fair return on
his money growing smaller.
Investment trusts such as these are "orphan"
trusts. They have no sponsorship, or a sponsorship which
confines its activity to a "do nothing" attitude.
This orphan situation arose under the Investment
Company Act of 1940. These companies have been called
upon to register under this act if they hope to continue
to redeem their certificates.
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Investment trust men such as C. Shelby Carter,
president of the First New England Corporation, have
analyzed the industry and have discovered a large number
of these ’’orphans , ” Mr. Carter feels that public opinion
and pressure might be brought to bear on these companies
to clean up the picture. If the public would bother to
concern itself about the orphans of the industry there
would be no problem, for no sensible man would leave his
money in an institution wherein percentage paid for man-
agement costs showed no inclination to do anything but
18
rise
.
A consolidation of these outcast trusts may be a
solution to the problem. If this were planned many prob-
lems would arise in regard to portfolios, management,
sponsorship, rules and regulations concerning diversifi-
cation, trustees, to mention a few. To concern oneself
with these problems would call for a separate study rather
on a tangent to this research.
However, these problems are not unique. It must
be borne constantly In mind that this industry is still
in its youth and still has the ’’growing pains” of adoles-
cence .
This chapter has continued the discussion of in-
vestment practices and policies, citing instances where
18. N. Y. Times, March 2, 1941, Financial Section
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companies have limited their activities to certain
classes of opportunities, as in the case of the Inland
Investors, which has limited itself to corporations
which have been in business for at least three years.
The investment trusts have limited the scope
of their activities by statements made in the rules of
incorporation, or in statements of policy, and by so
doing have defined for the investment public the inten-
tion of the management.
Various phases and types of regulation have been
discussed. The types range from voluntary regulation of
the weakest type, which merely defines the activities of
the company, to the Investment Company Act, which rather
rigidly restricts and controls the functions of the
company
*4 • . V
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The investment trust, being an infant industry,
has much to be desired in regard to management, cost to
the investor for purchase and resale of some classes of
securities, and the investment theory and practice that
the industry, as a whole pursues. With these weaknesses
in mind, just what justification may be found, then, for
the existence of these trusts?
Scientific investment is a very difficult, if
not an impossible undertaking, but true business prof-
its may be obtained if the market operations are prop-
erly handled by competent persons in charge. The invest-
ment trust in the hands of effective management secures
an adequate return on the money invested.
The general theory of business profits
is applicable to investments; and fur-
ther investment of funds is a real busi-
ness, subject to the rewards of true
business foresight, and the losses inci-
dent to attempts on the part of the poor
business manager to invest funds. The
school teacher, clergyman, shoe manu-
facturer, know enough about their own
respective business to feel assured
that the ordinary uninitiated could not
succeed without long and specialized
training. Yet these men stand ready
to embark on one of the most intricate
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businesses -- that of investment --
requiring perhaps the most extensive
and far-reaching specialized knowledge
of any profession or business.
^
To the layman interested in investing some cap-
ital in the securities market, the technical details
mean little or nothing to this type of person. A tech-
nical knowledge in investment is not his.
The investment trust, with its efficient techni-
cally trained personnel, is in a position to help the
layman investor by offering to him the benefit of the
experience of the men composing the trust.
Investment trusts bring investment opportunity
within the reach of ell classes of people, including
those individuals who, because of various reasons, can-
not efficiently invest their funds directly. Invest-
ment, especially that which involves a considerable de-
gree of speculative risk is a business within itself.
Investment trusts offer to these people an opportunity
to have a part in the financial transactions of the
country.
These trusts tend to reduce risks incident to
investment at a distance or in holdings the merits of
which are not known. By placing funds with a trust the
risk is lessened, due to the fact that these companies
1. Speaker, Lawrence W. , The Investment Trust (New York:
A. W. Shaw Co., 1924)
,
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have at their disposal a greater amount of information
and technical skill which is required in the field of
securities
.
The trusts of the country also aid in the fi-
nancing of domestic enterprises. The policy of many
trusts is to nurse new industries until the company is
on its way to financial and industrial success.
The trusts do not attempt this financing as a
matter of common practice, hut when the opportunity
presents itself and the trusts are reasonably certain
that the investment is sound, money will be invested
in the enterprise.
In this way these companies serve a very use-
ful function in our economic system.
Investment trusts do not attempt to combine
ordinary commercial banking with the investment trust
business. A large amount of obligations tied up in de-
mand loans in time of financial strain will prove a
source of weakness. It is, therefore, good policy to
invest a considerable portion of the trust's funds in
securities that are readily marketable. This market-
ability is a very important consideration for upon it
depends the soundness of the assets of the company. An
investment trust with its assets so held that they are
not readily convertible will find itself in difficulties
.V
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if the occasion should arise when the trust needed
its funds.
Investments must have a certain amount of diver-
sification; i.e., security holdings so spread among a
number of industries as to assure safety in the port-
folio of the company. This diversification does not
mean, however, a large percentage of the assets in one
or two securities and the remainder spread over a large
number of companies. If this type of diversification
were used the safety factor would not be present.
Trusts attempt to place their securities under
a variety of plans, depending upon the individual com-
pany. Diversification may be accomplished by geograph-
ical distribution, industry distribution, or distribu-
tion in one particular type of security; i.e., bonds,
preferreds, or common stock of any issuer.
The potential investor must look to three main
items when considering an investment trust as an oppor-
tunity for investment, which are:
( 1 ) management
;
(2) investment policies and practices;
(3) dividend record.
Management has been studied in this research,
primarily from the standpoint of compensation in direct
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proportion to training and successful operation of the
trust. In this field, as in any other, to secure trained
management adequate compensation must be an inducement.
But the plan should be of a nature to continually en-
courage the management to increased success of the busi-
ness. Five plans have been advanced as a method of man-
agerial compensation. It is not possible to say that
one of the plans is better than the other four. Each
method of compensation has its advantages and each plan
has a very definite use in the various types of invest-
ment trusts.
As the name -- management trust -- implies, the
most important phase of this type of business is the
character and capability of management. Unless those
in control are honest, and at the same time have an ad-
equate knowledge of world finance, including the details
of investment trust administration, the results In most
cases will be failures.
Management in this field, as in any other busi-
ness enterprise, must have the things at its command and
that will make it possible for the company to weather
all types of business difficulties. The men in charge
must be dynamic, rather than static, types In order
that the company will progress at a tempo with the times.
Those in charge must not be sfraid to make a decision If
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they feel that the judgment they have made is to serve
as the best solution to any problem which they have
faced.
Along these same lines another problem has come
to mind in preparation of this research. It would be of
value to study the managers of representative trusts
throughout the country in an attempt to determine their
background, their connections with the field of finance
and the profits they have earned for their respective
companies
.
The investment policies and practices of any
particular company might be considered, in importance,
next, only, to the aspect of management, for upon this
phase of the business rests the possibility of success
or failure on the part of the company to declare divi-
dends. Along these lines this study has attempted to
present many of the phases, including diversification,
restrictions, criteria of investment, legals, listed
securities and the seasoned character of issues. All
these aspects of security purchasing must be considered
by management when securities are purchased. At no time
may any of the above-mentioned items be discarded, for
the soundness of the investment policy rests upon them.
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Costs are always of some importance regardless
of the type of business. In the investment trust field
the costs incident to marketing the company’s shares are
termed "loading charges." These charges have varied
with the individual companies, depending upon the amount
of compensation received by the distributors for their
task of marketing the shares. This charge is usually
stated as a fixed percentage of the net asset value per
share and represents the known premium over the basic
price which the investor pays to become a stock holder
or participant in an open-end trust. The important fact
to be noted in regard to loading charges it, however,
the hidden charges which the distribution of open-end
securities allows. These hidden charges are not found
in the distribution of closed-end securities.
All open-end companies are alike in that a cal-
culation of offering and redemption prices start with
the net asset value per share which is in turn based
upon the market value of the portfolio holdings.
Redemption fees are found only in open-end
trusts, as a holder of a closed-end trust certificate
has no right to redeem his holding for cash at the com-
pany’s expense. Here, as in the case of the sale of
shares, the fee goes to the principal distributor. There
has been, however, a tendency, in the past few years, to
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do away with this fee. The argument used to uphold
these redemption fees was that the company used this
charge as a form of insurance against its long-term
commitments which included salaries, wages, etc.
Some companies have used the fee as protection
to the remaining stockholders. Other open-end trusts
have the privilege to place a charge on redemption "but
have not done so.
The question of fees charged to the investors
has long been a source of argument, but the investor
should not be too concerned with the cost unless it ap-
pears that not enough of his invested dollar is reach-
ing the portfolio of the open-end trust.
Public offering has been the principal method
of distribution employed by the closed-end trusts as is
evidenced by the value of shares so distributed
($176,000,000) during the 1927-1935 period, as compared
with the value of shares ($167,000,000) sold to sponsor-
ing firms during this same period. Public offering then
2
has proved the most successful of the six methods used
by closed-end trusts.
Closed-end trusts, in the main, have been spon-
sored by houses of issue; i.e., investment bankers.
2. See p. 41
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brokers and dealers. Many persons are of the opinion
that the sponsorship was simply due to the desire for
profits. This might very well be true, but an advantage
presents itself in that the trusts now had capable back-
ing and technical knowledge to aid in the issuing of the
trust 1 s securities and purchasing of high-grade issues
for the portfolios.
The sponsors naturally derived profit from the
venture, but isn’t this true of all business undertak-
ings? For the knowledge and experience loaned to the
trust some compensation was necessary to the sponsors.
Investment banking has been a very valuable aid
in the floating of security issues. A new company will
run into difficulties while attempting to market un-
known issues, but a sponsor with a well-established
organization and a good name will have a very minimum
of difficulty in selling to the public a new issue.
The established name is similar to a guarantee.
Legislation last year has done much to protect
the holders of trust issues. "Jfhat the final result will
be is at this time impossible to determine. It may be
noted that, unqualifiedly, every witness representing
the industry endorsed the bill.
This bill is therefore a highly salutary indi-
cation that Government and business may cooperate in
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the proper spirit to do a constructive job. Represen-
tatives of the business felt that the bill, when passed,
would protect the industry from nefarious practices by
certain individuals or groups of individuals who would
use the industry to swindle investors. Representatives
further urged the passage of the bill due to the present
international situation.
The representatives of the industry felt that
proper and reasonable regulation of investment trusts
would stimulate the companies to supply new capital for
the expansion of industry, particularly industries
vital to our national defense. To speed up this activ-
ity the bill authorizes investment companies to con-
tribute a portion of their capital to companies organ-
ized by themselves to underwrite the securities of, and
to furnish capital to, industry.
The necessity for the regulation arose, then,
from certain practices carried on by individuals, or
groups, within the industry. Heavy losses have been
suffered by investors due to these nefarious practices.
These mal-practices cannot entirely be eliminated by
the individual companies, many of whom have placed
rigid regulations in their by-laws; they must be stopped
by Federal regulation. This conclusion was conceded by
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virtually every witness who appeared before the sub-
committee of the House of Representatives.
The Securities Act of 1955 and the Security
Exchange Act of 1954 have not acted as deterrents to
the continuous occurrence of abuse in the organization
and operation of trusts. These acts provide, primarily,
for publicity. Publicity is not enough to remove the
mal-practice from the field. Further, the great major-
ity of investment companies have never come within the
jurisdiction of these acts.
The Act, then, is necessary to protect the small
investor from the breaches of trust upon the part of
certain managements, and provide such persons with the
protection that comes from a regulated industry. This
legislation will also prevent those abuses that have
damaged the Industry, as a whole.
The committee hearings brought forth another
problem; namely, taxes. This problem has already been
recognized as existing in the case of certain open-end
trusts. No attempt has been made in this study to pre-
sent the problem of taxes. This field is a study in it-
self, and could not be incorporated in any other study
and still do justice to one field or the other.
An attempt has been made in the previous chapter
to show what the trusts have been doing in regard to
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their portfolio holdings within the past two years.
The significance of this study is an attempt to deter-
mine a trend within the industry. The increase in cash
holdings would indicate that the trusts are carrying
out a program of cautious purchases and sales. The
Lease Lend Bill may have been a reason for the increased
cash position. Until this bill was passed there was a
certain feeling of uncertainty as to what course of ac-
tion the Government would pursue.
A further proof of the cautious policies being
pursued by the trusts is the increase by almost 100$ of
preferred stocks. The trusts, in purchasing preferreds,
seem to be seeking a guaranteed income of a certain per-
centage rather than a higher rate of return plus an in-
crease in speculation. All this caution seems to be
borne out in the market of late. The exchange has ex-
perienced some very slow days at which time common stocks
fell off one to three points. By placing funds in pre-
ferreds the trusts are certain of percentages on their
invested capital.
Investment trusts, in purchasing common, have, in
the main, concerned themselves with those industries es-
sential to our national defense -- such stocks as United
States Steel, Continental Oil, Dow Chemical, Bethlehem
Steel, Pennsylvania Railroad -- to mention a few. This
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is an obvious attempt to convert the rush of defense
to industry into profits for the companies.
Weighing these purchases of common stocks
against the increased cash holdings and purchases of
preferreds, what are the conclusions to be? Obvious-
ly, the trust managements are uncertain as to the plan
of action. They are too fearful of future events to
invest heavily in the common stock securities of the
day, yet they apparently show a desire to increase such
holdings as evidenced by the purchases of securities
issued by companies vitally concerned with defense.
The question will probably be answered within a rela-
tively short space of time. America has now committed
herself to a very definite policy of all-out aid to
Britain. For the first time in months investment trusts,
as well as others interested in finance, have something
very definite on which to base their investment theories.
Managers of trusts must now plan their policies and so
arrange their portfolios as to receive the maximum ad-
vantage from the national program of defense.
In doing this research many questions beyond the
scope of this study have entered the author's mind. One
such question concerns the payment of dividends by in-
vestment trusts. No mention has been made of dividends
though they are of importance to the investor. The
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Investment Company Act devotes one whole section (19)
to this question.
This thesis, when originally planned, was to
deal exclusively with the open-end concept of trusts;
but study in the field subsequently brought forth the
fact that a study of this subject would require nothing
but original research. As this was impossible at this
time the study of one concept of investment work had
to be given up. This problem, however, still remains
in the author’s mind, for so few people have ever heard
the term, let alone know the actual workings of such a
trust. It is desired to some day make such a study.
Investment trusts have fallen into somewhat of
a decline in the past few years and because of this most
of the newer material that was read as background mater-
ial had to be cast aside as only one viewpoint was pre-
sented .
It is the author’s contention that investment
trusts play a major role in our economic life and, if
properly regulated, may climb to new heights as a sound
form of investment for one of limited means. Only time
will be able to bear out this contention, in view of the
regulation now imposed by the Government, plus the reg-
ulations that trusts have placed upon themselves as a
result of the losses in the years following 1929.
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Experience is the best teacher, and if this proves to
be true for investment trusts, it is more than a prob-
ability that they will climb to a better place in the
financial world.
As institutions such as insurance companies,
banks, loan associations, all serve a definite function
in our financial sphere, so do investment trusts for
the reasons that have been shown in this chapter. Some
people would have others believe that the investment
trust field is overrun with mal-practices
,
as is no
other field. This is an absolute untruth. Every indus-
try, in passing through its early years, has had this
same difficulty. The railroads of the past century,
while serving a very definite function, were hotbeds of
swindlers. It was the same with the oil industry. It
may be found in the history of most utilities.
The investment trust, as we know it today, is
approximately seventeen years of age. In this short
time it has not emerged from its period of so-called
errors. But in a few years, when maturity has been
reached, a test should then be made and a very definite
conclusion drawn as to the real need for investment
trusts
.
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APPENDIX
GENERAL AMERICAN COMPANY, INC.
(Office: 120 Broadway, New York City)
Incorporated October, 1928. In September, 1929,
it was absorbed by merger. General American Investors
Company, Inc.; holders of 800,000 shares of common stock
(no par) of old General American Investors, receiving in
exchange therefor no par value common stock of corpora-
tion, on a share for share basis, and corporation assum-
ing the $7,500,000 5%, 25 year debentures. Series A, due
February 1, 1952. Business of the company is to acquire,
hold, sell and underwrite securities of eny nature, both
foreign and domestic.
Classification of Portfolio, Section 24
(in thousands)
1959
amount % of Total Amount
1938
% of Total
Bonds:
Industrial 233 0.82 230 0.74
Railroad 515 1.81 388 1.25
Public Utilities 152 0.53 429 1.38
Total 900 3.16 1047 3.37
Total Preferred Stock
2408 8.46 1273 4.10
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1939 1938
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
Common Stocks:
Industrial 19750 69.35 25060 77.58
Railroad 1138 3.99 916 2.96
Public Utilities 3087 10.84 2116 6.83
Financial 1196 4.20 1600 5.16
Total Common
Stock 25171 88.38 28692 92.58
Total 28479 100. 31012 100.
Capital Stock
* Authorized Outstanding Dec. 31,1939
0 Preferred (no par) 94,000# 72,000
Common (no par) 3,500,000 1,300,220
#28,000 shares have "been retired hut 6,000
shares have been eliminated from authorized
capital
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ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY
A voluntary association formed in July 1854, under
common laws of New York State; was formerly engaged in ex-
press business. Express business was consolidated in
American Railway Express, which company took over the
express rights; Adams Express took over stock of American
Railway Express.
Classification of Assets
(in thousands)
1959 1938
Stocks ;
Oils
Bid. & Real Estate
Mining
Investment
Iron and Steel
Electric Equipment
Office Equipment
Agricultural
Equipment
Amusements
Aviation
Chemicals
Railroads
R. R. Equipment
Rubb er
Merchandise
Shipping
Distiller
Automotors
Fertilizer
advertising
Public Utilities
Sugar
Miscellaneous
Amount % of Total
3937 13.16
2083 7.15
3663 12.57
1814 6.23
2361 8.11
1418 4.87
1281 4.40
1089 3.74
629 2.16
1263 4.34
1455 4.99
149 0.51
241 0.83
553 1.90
552 1.89
772 2.66
75 0.26
213 0.73
38 0.13
237 0.81
Amount % of Total
4368 13.12
3185 9.56
4160 12.49
2127 6.39
2797 8.40
1330 4.00
1844 5.54
999 3.00
972 2.92
1142 3.43
653 1.96
239 .72
388 1.16
309 4.93
1490 4.47
357 1.07
17 0.5
1321 3.97
184 .55
188 .54
613 1.84
69 .21
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1939 1938
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
Bonds 1130 3.88 1619 4.86
Total Investment 24996 85.82 30363 91.18
Cash 4072 13.98 2688 8.07
Acc. Int. & Div. 40 0.14 58 .18
Amt. Rec. for Ser.
Sold 3 0.01 178 .54
Property and Equip
(Book Value) 14 0.05 12 too•
Total Assets 29126 100. 33299 100.
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INCORPORATED INVESTORS
Incorporated November 23, 1925, in Massachusetts,
as a mutual investment trust. The funds of the trust are
invested under the guidance of the Board of Directors
upon whose discretion Articles of Incorporation place no
distinction. Policy of the company is to place not more
than 5% of the fund in one security. In no sense is this
a fixed trust; supervision is constant and changes are made
when necessary. Securities owned by the trust are held by
the Old Colony Trust Company.
Management . All statistical, clerical and administrative
services are supplied by the management for a fixed fee of
\ of one per cent a year of the principal; deduction does
not include taxes, brokerage fees and transfer charges
which are paid by the company.
Diversification of Portfolio
1939 1938
Cash and Government Service 9.6 5.3
Metals and Mining 11.3 14.3
Chemicals 8.8 9.8
Railroads 8.1 9.9
Building 4.9 6.6
Oils 9.6 9.1
Electric Equipment 7.4 7.5
Steel 4.9 5.7
Aviation 3.3 2.9
Merchandise 4.9 5.1
Miscellaneous 13.1 13.4
Banks and Finance 5.1 4.4
Automobile 5.7 4.6
Public Utilities 3.3 1.4
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THE LEHMAN CORPORATION
Incorporated September 11, 1929, in Delaware,
as investment trust of the general management type.
There are no restrictions on the purchase or sale of
securities
.
Classification of Assets
(in thousands)
1959 1938
-Bonds
:
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
Cash & Receivables
U. S. Gov. Sec.
2767
4639
4.0
6.8
1563
6302
2.2
8.8
Total 7407 10.8 7865 11.0
Other Bonds:
Public Utilities 668 1.0 1477 2.1
Railroads 511 0.7 606 0.8
Merchandise 2275 3.3 2278 3.2
Total 3455 5.0 4361 6.1
Preferred Stocks:
Public Utilities 2836 4.1 2145 3.0
Railroads 61 0.1 123 0.2
Merchandise 239 0.4 1245 1.7
Total 3136 4.6 3513 4.9
Common Stocks:
Agricultural Mach. 1774 2.6 2023 2.8
Auto and Rubber 4645 6.8 3759 5.2
Aviation 2250 3.3 2067 2.9
Bank. & Finance 1880 2.7 1993 2.8
Building and
Construction 1548 2.3 3542 4.9
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Common Stocks (continued):
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
Cans and Contain. 1718 2.5 1063 1.5
Chemicals 6370 9.5 4444 6.3
Foods and
Beverages 2470 3.6 1955 2.8
Machinery and
Equipment 3033 4.4. 3446 4.8
Manufacturing, etc .2244 3.3 2175 3.0
Merchandise 4791 7.0 5654 7.9
Metals & Mining 3761 . 5.6 6194 8.6
Oils 6869 10.0 8363 11.7
Public Utilities 4790 7.0 4186 5.8
Railroads 2027 3.0 1956 2.7
Railroad Equipment 1611 2.3 - 1634 2.3
Steel 2384 3.5 240 0.3
Tobacco 155 0.2 668 0.9
Total 54421 79.3 55364 77.2
Invest. Real Est.
Corporation 100 0.15 412 0.6
Other Real Estate
Investments > 100 0.15 150 0.2
Gross Assets 68618 100. 71666 100.
Less Liabilities 510 698
Less Allowance for
Federal & State
Income Taxes — 255
Net Assets 68108 70713
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SPENCER TRASK FUND, INC
Incorporated in March, 1929, in Delaware, to
invest and deal in stocks and securities of all kinds,
to participate in syndicates and underwritings, and to
exercise other powers granted by certification of cor-
porations .
Classification of Net Assets
(in thousands)
Market Value
1939 1938
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
Automobile 278
Aviation 91
Building & Material
Chemicals 571
Communication 222
Electrical Equip. 116
Merchandising 498
Mining & Smelting 240
Misc. Manufacturing 169
Oil 65
Public Utility 221
Railroad 166
Railroad Equipment
Steel 71
Cash & Other Assets 574
8.4 271 5.6
2.7 — —
— 464 9.6
17.1 555 11.5
6.6 269 5.6
3.5 508 10.6
14.9 561 11.7
7.2 378 —
5.0 — —
1.9 — —
6.6 — —
4.9 — —
2.1
17.2
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STATE STREET INVESTMENT CORPORATION
Incorporated in July, 1924, in Massachusetts,
to provide a medium for the examination and selection of
common stocks; to own the best ones during favorable per-
iods and to take a partial cash or cash equivalent position
during unfavorable periods. In 1952 it acquired the assets
of Pittsburgh Bond and Share Corporation. As of October,
1933, it purchased the assets of Investors Security Company
of Massachusetts, and in December, 1933, acquired the stock
of Mohawk Investment.
Management . State Street Research and Management
Company (a partnership) pays all expenses of management,
research, bookkeeping, etc., in consideration of a quarter-
ly fee equal to 1/8 of one per cent for the market value
of the net assets of the corporation, plus one dollar per
share charged for shares repurchased by the corporation
(to redemption charge)
.
Earnings Data --
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935
1934
1933
1932
December 51, 1959
2.97
1 • 66
4.17
3.81
1.52
1.15
0.68
1.60
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